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Nondischargeability, and Penal Debt
Abbye Atkinson*
This Article examines the issue of categorically
nondischargeable debts in the Bankruptcy Code. These debts are
excepted from discharge ostensibly because they indicate that the
debtor incurred the debt through some misconduct, there is an
important public policy at play that requires the debt to be excepted
from discharge, or a discharge of certain state-imposed ebts raises
federalism concerns. Using penal debt as its lens, this Article critiques
these analytical frames, arguing that they do not do much work to help
explain why some debts are treated as categorically nondischargeable
while others that seem to implicate the same concerns are not treated
similarly. The practical consequence of this analytical murkiness is
that some debtors may look to the Bankruptcy Code for relief from
unmanageable debt while others may not. Significantly, this arbitrary
line-drawing has negative implications for economically and socially
disenfranchised communities in which categorically nondischargeable
debts may be concentrated. This Article argues that categorical
nondischargeability denies relief from unmanageable and socially
undesirable debt to those who are least able to bear the burden of
ongoing debt.
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INTRODUCTION
On a hot summer's day in 2014, newly minted eighteen-year-
old Michael Brown died at the hands of the state, in the middle of a
Ferguson, Missouri, street. His death and the subsequent Department
of Justice investigation brought into sharp relief a pervasive system of
DISCHARGING PENAL DEBT
profit-motivated justice that binds whole communities with
unrelenting and unmanageable penal debt.
"Penal debt"-which includes debt stemming from civil and
criminal penalties and fines, prosecution costs, court fees, usage fees,'
and interest-is a significant problem borne disproportionately by
over-policed and economically disenfranchised communities. This debt
has resulted in a crush of socially undesirable debt spirals in many
communities like Ferguson, Missouri, where "nearly a quarter of
residents and over a third of children live below the poverty line." 2 For
example, in circa 2013 Ferguson, with its predominantly African-
American population of twenty-one thousand and a per capita income
of just $20,472, the Ferguson Municipal Court issued 32,975 arrest
warrants for nonviolent offences.3 The city then routinely jailed
individuals who could not pay off the resulting debt.4
Ferguson is a cautionary tale of the perverse incentives that
have followed the "dramatic expansion" of fines and fees bearing little
relationship to traditional goals of civil and criminal liability and
fashioned instead to fill in gaps in municipal funding.5 The vast
majority of individuals caught in this web of legal financial obligations
are indigent,6 making slight the likelihood that any significant
number of them can afford to pay.7 When these individuals are
1. See Developments in the Law-Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1727 (2015)
(describing usage fees in the criminal context, including arrest, adjudication, and incarceration
costs).
2. Id. at 1724; see also Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Gangsters of Ferguson, ATLANTIC (Mar. 5,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/The-Gangsters-Of-Ferguson/386893/
[https://perma.cc[M7HR-SVTQ] (examining how the Ferguson police force uses black residents of
the community to generate revenue).
3. Developments in the Law-Policing, supra note 1, at 1724.
4. See, e.g., Ryan J. Reilly & Mariah Stewart, Ferguson Considers Settling Suit over
'Debtors Prison'Abuses, HUFFINGTON POsT (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
ferguson-municipal-court-federal-civil-rights-lawsuit us562542a7e4bbce34701a232
[https://perma.cc/DP44-NHBC] (describing Department of Justice report that made this finding
and the private lawsuits resulting from it).
5. ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE
POOR 18-23 (2016); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 154-55 (2012) (characterizing the range of fines, fees, and costs
that are imposed on defendants as "generally quite new-created by law within the past twenty
years").
6. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 85.
7. See Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha & Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier
to Reentry, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1-2, (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/legacy/Fees%20and%2OFines%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.ce/2R6N-RMVN] (illustrating
relationship between inability to pay legal debt and incarceration); see also Stephen J. Ware,
Debt, Poverty, and Personal "Financial Distress," 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 493, 501 (2015) ("[P]overty
(being 'poor') generally correlates with low income, and even small debts can quickly overwhelm
someone with a very low income." (citation omitted)).
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deemed willful in their failure to pay, the state can seize their bodies.8
Thus, perhaps most significantly, penal debt occupies an important
space in economically disenfranchised communities because it
regularly imperils the only asset that individuals who live there are
likely to truly possess: their liberty.9
Curiously, even though unmanageable penal debt
disproportionately sends the most economically vulnerable individuals
into socially undesirable debt spirals, our bankruptcy laws-which as
a normative matter are focused on stemming that very problem and
thus promoting a "fresh start" for unduly overburdened debtorsI0
generally do not permit a debtor to discharge criminal and civil penal
debt. Penal debt, along with twenty other categories of debt, is
categorically nondischargeable.11 This exceptional treatment is
explained by reference to public policy, misconduct, and federalism
concerns. Specifically, the debts subject to the extraordinary
treatment of categorical nondischargeability purportedly are incurred
through some misconduct, implicate an important public interest or
issue, andlor involve some undue encroachment of the federal
bankruptcy power onto important state interests or prerogatives.12
8. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (finding that trial court erred by
failing to make determination of willfulness before seizing petitioner); see also Radley Balko,
How Municipalities in St. Louis County, Mo., Profit from Poverty, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-
profits-from-poverty/?utmterm=.c997ed08e4e3 [https://perma.cc/N24B-VMYU]:
Bolden didn't show up in court because she didn't have the money to pay it and feared
they'd put her jail. It's a common and unfortunate misconception among St. Louis
County residents, especially those who don't have an attorney to tell them otherwise.
A town can't put you in jail for lacking the money to pay a fine. But you can be jailed
for not appearing in court to tell the judge you can't pay-and fined again for not
showing up.
9. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595, 1630 (2015)
("Using the threat of incarceration to pressure low-income people to pay off their debts has
become a common strategy of the criminal justice system."); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the
Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 290-91 (2014) (noting that "some people are
never able to pay off economic sanctions, [and] the threat of arrest and incarceration may be
perpetual"); Bannon, Nagrecha & Diller, supra note 7, at 2 (observing that "[a]lthough 'debtors'
prison' is illegal in all states, reincarcerating individuals for failure to pay debt is, in fact,
common in some-and in all states new paths back to prison are emerging for those who owe
criminal justice debt").
10. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934). See generally Thomas H. Jackson,
The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985) (exploring the
"fresh-start" policy).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012) (listing exceptions to discharge); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1 523.13 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2016) (categorizing "criminal fines"
as an exception to discharge under Section 523(a)(7)).
12. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUP'rCY 53-54 (4th ed. 2006)
(discussing types of and motivations for Section 523 exceptions).
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Yet, many other debts that implicate public policy, stem from
debtor misconduct, and/or raise federalism concerns, like
environmental liability, tort liability for reckless or negligent
behavior, and state income taxes under certain conditions, are readily
dischargeable even though, when viewed through the lens of the
existing frames, they look very similar to categorically
nondischargeable debts. Consequently, this Article critiques the
existing analytical frames by arguing that they do not provide a
satisfying means for us to understand why some debts are accorded
the exceptional treatment of categorical nondischargeability while
others are not. The practical consequence of this analytical murkiness
is that some debtors have access to relief and a fresh start and others
do not. Moreover, this line-drawing has distributional effects across
the socioeconomic spectrum, proving to disfavor certain debts along
social and class lines. It functions to deny a pathway to debt relief for
debtors based on their lower socioeconomic status and the resulting
debt they are more likely to carry.
The categorical nondischargeability of penal debt gives some
insight into this problem. Penal debt is a useful example because it is
an important public policy problem of particular salience in present
times. Moreover, as a debt problem that implicates socially
undesirable debt spirals in many communities, penal debt falls
squarely within the ambit of bankruptcy's principal concern. Yet
Congress and the courts have branded it as categorically
nondischargeable on the basis of each of the existing frames. On closer
view, however, the frames do not explain why penal debt should be
treated so exceptionally as compared to other debts that implicate the
same concerns. Moreover, the penal debt example gives insight into
how the frames themselves are deployed in an oversimplified manner
in a set of complex social circumstances that defy such simple
classification. More specifically, by categorically excluding penal debt
from discharge, bankruptcy law leaves a wide swath of already
financially vulnerable people without access to debt relief, even
though it is unclear whether the benefits of nondischargeability (for
example, deterrence in the penal debt context) outweigh the costs of
unrelenting debt in the communities least able to bear it.
Thus, the current crisis of penal debt stemming from the
nontraditional use of fines and fees as a source of municipal funding
creates an opportunity to reconsider the concept of categorical
nondischargeability in the Bankruptcy Code more generally. It helps
us to take up the difficult task of trying to resolve the tensions
between the corrosive and paralyzing effects of overwhelming debt
and policy concerns that, at least in some cases, favor permanent
9212017]
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liability. Bankruptcy scholars and commentators, however, have paid
significant attention to neither this treatment of penal debt13 nor to
the broader question of whether, lacking an intelligible organizing
framework, categorical nondischargeability frustrates the fresh start
by subordinating relief for certain overburdened debtors. In so doing,
the literature has overlooked possible reforms to bankruptcy law that
could promote what, as a normative matter, bankruptcy is supposed to
accomplish: providing a backstop against socially undesirable debt
spirals. In that regard, this Article makes a unique contribution to the
literature by engaging with the question of categorical
nondischargeability as in tension with the fresh start principle. More
broadly, through its examination of the nondischargeability of penal
debt and its focus on the connection between bankruptcy law and
criminal law, this Article aspires to engage with larger questions of
debt relief and the social utility of bankruptcy law, with an end to
addressing socially undesirable debt.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the basic
operation of consumer bankruptcy law and its normative orientation,
the fresh start. It describes bankruptcy's goal of maximizing ex post
productivity while motivating socially optimal risk-taking ex ante.
Part II describes the set of twenty-one debts that, fresh start
notwithstanding, are categorically excepted from discharge. It focuses
on penal debt as an example of an exception to discharge, tracing the
history of this exceptional treatment as both a statutory and doctrinal
matter. Part III describes the frames that justify categorical
nondischargeability: misconduct, public policy, and federalism. It
argues that these analytical frames are incoherent to the extent that
there is no clear distinction between currently listed debts that are
excepted from discharge and other debts that seem to implicate the
very same concerns yet are readily dischargeable. Focusing on penal
debt, it shows how the frames provide little structure for the notion of
categorical nondischargeability where complex social circumstances
belie such simplistic, determinative classifications. It further contends
that this treatment unduly limits debt relief for the most vulnerable
debtors, limiting bankruptcy's utility across the socioeconomic
spectrum. It closes by arguing that because the current frames for
categorical exception to discharge do not make sense, there is an
opportunity for rethinking the concept of categorical
nondischargeability, particularly where it tends to subordinate
bankruptcy's normative principle, the fresh start. Part IV broadens
13. Notable exceptions include Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Federalism: A Doctrine
Askew, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2010).
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the scope of the Article to suggest how bankruptcy law might take on
greater social utility. Moreover, this view is consistent with current
scholarly views of bankruptcy utility.
I. BANKRUPTCY BASICS AND THE FRESH START PRINCIPLE
Consumer bankruptcy is the primary means by which
overburdened debtors may discharge unmanageable debt. The
bankruptcy discharge is non-waivable,14 and, proverbially, it
represents a "fresh start" for those fortunate enough to receive a
discharge. 15 At the outset, it may be helpful to those unfamiliar with
bankruptcy law to know some basic aspects of bankruptcy operation.
After this primer, I then describe the fresh start principle that
operates at the heart of consumer bankruptcy law and dictates the
bounds of the discharge of debt.
A. Bankruptcy Basics
An individual debtor has two principal options for debt relief
under the Bankruptcy Code.16 First, the debtor can file a petition
under Chapter 7, in which she turns over her personal assets that are
not exempt from collection (generally as determined under state law)
to a bankruptcy trustee. 17 The trustee then sells those assets and uses
the proceeds to repay the debtor's creditors on a pro rata basis.18 The
typical Chapter 7 proceeding is a short affair. Because most filers in
Chapter 7 have no assets available for liquidation,19 the result is that
general unsecured creditors usually recover little to nothing, while the
debtor receives her discharge with the hope of reengaging the market
with a renewed financial life.
14. See Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (2000).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 128 (1977) ("Perhaps the most important element of the
fresh start for a consumer debtor after bankruptcy is discharge."); TERESA A. SULLIVAN,
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE IDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN
DEBT 13 (2000) ("[Tjhe 'fresh start' . . . is the traditional objective of American bankruptcy law,
with ... future income free of old debts."); Jackson, supra note 10, at 1393 (exploring the "fresh-
start" policy).
16. Under certain circumstances, individual debtors may also file for bankruptcy protection
under Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2012).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012).
18. See Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy
Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 116 (2011) (summarizing the quick Chapter 7 proceedings).
19. See Dali6 Jimenez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Cases, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 795, 797 (2009) (finding that ninety-three percent of Chapter 7 debtors
had no nonexempt assets).
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Alternatively, the debtor may choose to reorganize her debts
under Chapter 13,20 where the debtor keeps both exempt and
nonexempt assets.21 In exchange, the debtor must complete a
bankruptcy court-approved Chapter 13 plan in which the debtor
devotes a portion of future disposable income to the repayment of her
creditors over a three- or five-year period.22 Generally, the court will
grant a discharge of eligible debt only if the debtor successfully
completes her multi-year Chapter 13 plan.2 3
B. Discharge and the "Fresh Start"
The discharge of debt is the crux of the fresh start principle,
which has at its heart a set of consequentialist justifications. In his
seminal article on the normative foundation of the fresh start
principle, Professor Thomas Jackson reasoned that the non-waivable
right of discharge in bankruptcy is properly premised on twin defects
in human nature, one volitional and one cognitive, and on the
externalities engendered by a waivable discharge right.24 As to the
volitional justification, Jackson described individuals as comprised of
two personalities: an "impulse personality" that prioritizes "current
gratification" and a "rational self' that prioritizes "postponed
gratification. . . in accordance with the individual's entire set of wants
and desires."25 Yet Jackson observed that even the impulse
personality "will nevertheless favor a rule that requires [it] to defer
gratification."26 For this reason, the "tendency of individuals to desire
external restraints on their impulses provides a basis for" favoring "a
socially imposed rule" that subordinates the tendency of the impulse
personality and instead "enforce[s] the hypothesized decisions of the[]
20. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2012).
21. Exempt property is property that under state law cannot be attached for the repayment
of debt. The Bankruptcy Code includes a set of exemptions that debtors may select, provided that
the debtor's state permits the filer to select the federal exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). Most Chapter 13 filings are dismissed before the debtor receives a
discharge, which has caused some to question the efficacy and value of Chapter 13. See Porter,
supra note 18, at 116 (stating that Chapter 7 "account[s] for about two-thirds of consumer filings
in recent years").
24. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 1418.
25. Id. at 1408.
26. Id. at 1408 & n.47 (quoting Mark Crain, Thomas Deaton, Randall Holcombe & Robert
Tollison, Rational Choice and the Taxation of Sin, 8 J. PUB. EcON. 239, 244 (1977)) (studying the
behavior of pigeons who "[wihen offered a choice between [a] small [and] immediate reward and
a large delayed reward" will choose the small reward. However, when "offered the choice now to




fully rational sel[fl." 27 In the bankruptcy context, the non-waivable
bankruptcy discharge causes creditors to "monitor borrowing."28
Jackson argued that because this monitoring limits the impulse
personality's tendency to incur debt without reasonable consideration
of the future ability to repay it, the discharge "might be the best
means to assist individuals in controlling impulsive credit decisions."29
As to the cognitive justification, Jackson described a world in
which individuals suffer from "systematic failures in their cognitive
processes," which cause them to "make choices in which they
consistently underestimate future risks."30 The problem is one of
"incomplete information" rather than irrational behavior.3 1 These
"incomplete heuristics" cause individuals to make present decisions
that "do[] not give due regard to . . . long-term desires and goals,"3 2 in
turn causing individuals to "underestimat[e] the risks that their
current consumption imposes on their future well-being."33 Thus,
Jackson concluded that absent some means of regular and widespread
self-correction, the non-waivable discharge provides a beneficial
corrective mechanism.
Lastly, Jackson argued that the bankruptcy discharge helps to
limit externalities that arise from unmanageable debt-debt that a
debtor might "systematically ignore" absent a non-waivable discharge
rule.34 For example, Jackson noted that the debtor's dependents might
suffer from the debtor's decision to forgo a right to discharge
unmanageable debts.35 He also described a social cost attendant to the
potential loss of the debtor's individual productivity: "Requiring debts
to be paid out of future income may lead an indebted individual to
devote more of his energies and resources to leisure, a consumption
item that his creditors cannot reach."3 6 In other words, a debtor who,
without relief, must devote her wages to the repayment of
unmanageable debt has little incentive to go out into the world and be
productive. This is because she would get no benefit from the fruits of
27. Id. at 1408-09.
28. Id. at 1409. As the parties who now bear the risk of loss in a bankruptcy proceeding,
creditors then have the incentive to make sure that they do not lend to borrowers whose risk of
default is too high. Id. at 1409-10.
29. Id. at 1409--10.
30. Id. at 1410.
31. Id.
32. Id. Jackson defines heuristics as "tools that individuals employ in processing and
assessing information." Id. at 1411.
33. Id. at 1411-12.
34. Id. at 1418.
35. Id. at 1419.
36. Id. at 1420.
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her labor, and in turn she can force the creditor to "bear. . the costs
of [her] decision to substitute leisure for wages."37 This loss of
productivity in turn is costly to society to the extent that the debtor's
performance of her job has "a social utility that [her wage does] not
fully reflect."38
From an economic perspective, Professors Barry Adler, Ben
Polak, and Alan Schwartz have further advanced a theory of the fresh
start framed in terms of optimal ex ante and ex post efficiencies.39
They argue that the optimal discharge in consumer bankruptcy would
promote two ex ante goals and two ex post goals. As an ex ante
matter, the bankruptcy discharge "insure[s] consumers, to the extent
possible, against bad income realizations and ... reduce[s] moral
hazard in connection with lending agreements."40 As an ex post
matter, the discharge allows debtors to voluntarily exchange their
right to their own future income "for the [creditors'] right to retain
nonexempt assets" and "not excessively [to] lien a debtor's human
capital."41
Taken together, Jackson's conception of the normative goals of
the fresh start and Adler, Polak, and Schwartz's economic theory of
bankruptcy utility suggest that the fresh start is important because
the individual who is overburdened with debt is unable to live a
productive life and take socially optimal risks that facilitate
meaningful participation in the market.42 From this vantage point,
bankruptcy law balances the risk that too much debt will unduly limit
productivity ex post against the risk that too much debt relief will
unduly encourage risky behavior ex ante.
Thus, discharge in consumer bankruptcy functions to free the
debtors who would otherwise be so hampered by unmanageable debt
that they would stop contributing to society in a meaningful way.4 3
37. Id. at 1422.
38. Id.
39. See Adler, Polak & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 586-87.
40. Id. at 608.
41. Id. at 609.
42. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, America's Uneasy Relationship with the Working Poor,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 40 (1999) (examining a practical approach to bankruptcy); Doug
Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C. L. REV. 723, 726 (1980)
(citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 65 (1973)). From the creditor's perspective, bankruptcy provides an orderly
resolution of outstanding debts in which similarly situated creditors can be assured of equal and
fair treatment. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 10, at 1395-96 (arguing that a fresh start policy is
consistent with creditors' needs).
43. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy
Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405,
414 (2005) ('The fresh start principle captures the notion that substantive relief should be
926 [Vol. 70:3:917
DISCHARGING PENAL DEBT
The optimal scope of bankruptcy discharge rights, then, encourages
the debtor to take socially beneficial risks by providing a mechanism
to reset her financial life when unmanageable debt interferes with a
productive and participatory life. 4 4
II. ON CATEGORICAL NONDISCHARGEABILITY
In light of the fresh start principle, it is a well-established tenet
of current bankruptcy law that the right to a discharge should be
interpreted broadly.45 Notwithstanding this norm and its significance
to the fresh start principle, there are certain debts that are
categorically nondischargeable. This exceptional treatment is in
tension with the fresh start principle because, from the outset, certain
debtors whose debts are categorically nondischargeable are prevented
from bankruptcy relief regardless of how debilitating the debt may
be.46 Rather, concerns about the restrictive and destructive power of
unmanageable debt fall away as against alternate concerns about
misconduct, public policy, and sometimes federalism, all of which have
functioned to support categorical nondischargeability. On closer view,
however, these analytical frames-misconduct, public policy, and
federalism-are incoherent as applied, insofar as they do not shed
light on why certain debts are treated exceptionally as
nondischargeable and why others are not.
A. Exceptions to Discharge
Debts that are excepted from a bankruptcy discharge are
principally codified in Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.47 As
afforded in the form of forgiveness of existing debt, with relinquishment by the debtor of either
existing nonexempt assets or a portion of future income, in order to restore the debtor to
economic productivity.").
44. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) ("[Bankruptcy] gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt." (emphasis omitted)); Dickerson, supra note
42, at 40.
45. E.g., Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915) ("In view of the well-known purposes of
the bankrupt law, exceptions to the operation of a discharge thereunder should be confined to
those plainly expressed. . . ."); Ryan v. United States (In re Ryan), 389 B.R. 710, 713-14 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2008) ("[E]xceptions to discharge are interpreted strictly against objecting creditors and
in favor of debtors."); Kuper v. Spar (In re Spar), 176 B.R. 321, 326 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)
("[E]xceptions to discharge must be ... liberally construed in favor of the honest debtor.").
46. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 43, at 417-18 ("Any exception to discharge, of course,
encroaches upon the fresh start principle." (citing H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 3-4)).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012).
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enacted in 1978, Section 523(a) originally included nine types of
categorically nondischargeable debt stemming from: (1) certain taxes;
(2) fraud, false pretenses, or false representation; (3) liabilities that
the debtor did not list; (4) fraud or defalcation of a fiduciary,
embezzlement or larceny; (5) domestic support obligations; (6) willful
and malicious injury to property or person; (7) fines, fees, and
forfeitures; (8) certain student loans; and (9) liabilities that the debtor
did not list in a previous bankruptcy proceeding.48 Over the last four
decades, the list has grown to include a hodgepodge of twenty-one
types of debt,49 including debts incurred to pay fines or penalties
imposed under federal election law;5 0 debts stemming from certain
condominium association fees;5 1 debts stemming from filing fees and
court costs or expenses that a court assesses on a prisoner filing a civil
action, proceeding, or appeal;52 and debts for certain types of loans
owed to a pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan under the Tax
Code.53
The conventional wisdom is that categorically
nondischargeable debts are treated as such because they fall into
three broad categories: they stem from debtor misconduct; they
implicate an issue "thought to be particularly important," "where the
public policy at issue outweighs the debtor's need for a fresh start"; or
they represent some "mixture of both."5 4 In addition, federalism
concerns have also animated bankruptcy policy as to categorical
nondischargeability.55 The treatment of penal debt-which includes
debt stemming from civil and criminal penalties and fines, prosecution
costs, court fees, usage fees,56 and interest--exemplifies how these
48. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1978).
49. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, T 523.01.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(14B) (2012).
51. Id. § 523(a)(16).
52. Id. § 523(a)(17).
53. Id. § 523(a)(18).
54. BAIRD, supra note 12, at 53-54; DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRuPTCY 51
(3d ed. 2001); see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (observing that creating
categorically nondischargeable debts strikes a balance between protecting innocent parties and
not rewarding bad actors); Scott F. Norberg, Contract Claims and the 'Willful and Malicious
Injury" Exception to the Discharge in Bankruptcy, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 175, 178 (2014) (stating
that "§ 523(a) precludes the discharge of certain categories of debts, owed to a particular creditor,
including debts for 'willful and malicious injury' and other debts for dishonest or other culpable
misconduct").
55. See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 283-84 (discussing that both state and federal law govern
aspects of the bankruptcy proceeding); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) ("This reflection
of our federalism also must influence our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case.").
56. See Developments in the Law-Policing, supra note 1, at 1727 (describing usage fees in
the criminal context, including arrest, adjudication, and incarceration costs).
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frames have worked to justify categorical nondischargeability in the
Bankruptcy Code.
B. Orienting Examples
Public policy, misconduct, and federalism, either singularly on
in some combination, have functioned to frame the exceptional
treatment of other nondischargeable debts in consumer bankruptcy.
For example, misconduct and public policy justifications have
underpinned the exceptional treatment of student loans, which are
listed among Section 523(a)'s list of nondischargeable debts.57 They
are conditionally dischargeable in that a debtor must bring an
adversarial proceeding in the course of a bankruptcy filing to establish
that the repayment of the loan would constitute an "undue burden"
prospectively on the debtor.58 The apparent challenge of succeeding in
meeting this standard, however, renders student loans practically
nondischargeable.5 9
Student loans first became nondischargeable in bankruptcy in
the mid-1970s just before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 replaced
the existing bankruptcy law with the Bankruptcy Code.60 Student
loans were dischargeable under the bankruptcy laws until 1976 when
amendments to the Higher Education Act made federally insured and
guaranteed student loans nondischargeable.61 These changes were
suggested by the Bankruptcy Commission, convened by Congress in
1970 to study and suggest changes to the 1898 Act, as amended. The
Bankruptcy Commission's report, issued in 1973, reflected its concern
that students were increasingly abusing the student loan system by
discharging loans in bankruptcy.62 By one account: "The
Commission ... reacted viscerally to anecdotal evidence of recent
graduates who had obtained discharges of their student loans without
any attempted repayment and in the absence of extenuating
circumstances."6 3 This, even though a General Accounting Office study
revealed that "less than one percent of federally insured student loans
were discharged in bankruptcy."64 Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy
57. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
58. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 43, at 418.
59. See Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of Student Loans: A Critical
Examination, 20 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 215, 271 (2014).
60. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 43, at 419.
61. Id. at 420-21.
62. Id.




Commission's concerns about potential student abuse and its desire
"to reinstate public confidence in the bankruptcy system" motivated
the commission to recommend this exceptional treatment of student
loans.65 Congress adopted this approach in the Bankruptcy Code.
Misconduct, public policy, and federalism have also framed the
categorical nondischargeability of certain tax debt and debts that have
been incurred through some fraud. With respect to tax debt, for
example, state income taxes (along with federal income taxes) are
dischargeable only under certain circumstances. In order to be
dischargeable, the tax must become due at least three years before the
bankruptcy filing date, the tax must be assessed within 240 days of
the filing date,66 and the return must have been filed at least two
years before the bankruptcy filing date.67
C. Penal Debt as a Principal Example
Similarly, penal debt is included in the list of twenty-one
nondischargeable debts enumerated in Section 523(a)(7). Specifically,
the statute excepts from discharge, "criminal and civil fines, penalties,
and forfeitures, that are payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit,68 and that are not imposed for pecuniary
purpose."6 9 In Kelly v. Robinson, the Supreme Court further concluded
that under Section 523(a)(7), any monetary condition that a court
imposes in any part for a penal purpose is also nondischargeable,
including state restitution obligations that are calculated based on the
actual loss to the victim. 70 Thus, almost any legal financial obligation
that can be characterized as penal in nature may be deemed
65. Id. at 420-21.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) (2012).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
68. The Code defines a "governmental unit" as:
United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state;
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States
trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a
Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other
foreign or domestic government.
11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2012).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). The text of Section 523(a)(7) provides:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... to the extent such debt is for a fne,
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss . . ..




nondischargeable even if under the plain text of Section 523(a)(7) it
should be dischargeable.
1. The Historical Treatment of Penal Debt in Bankruptcy
The bankruptcy law has arguably not always treated penal
debt in this way. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which was the first
lasting bankruptcy legislation passed by Congress, did not expressly
limit the discharge of penal debt. Section 63 of the 1898 Act described
the types of debts that were eligible to be paid in the bankruptcy
proceeding.71 These debts included a "fixed liability" plus interest
existing at the time that the petition was filed even if payment was
not yet due, provided that the liability was "founded upon provable
debts reduced to judgments after the filing of the petition."72 Under
Section 57 of the 1898 Act, creditors purporting to hold a claim against
the debtor's estate were required to "prove" the claim before it would
be "allowed" in the bankruptcy proceeding, i.e., eligible for payment
from the debtor's estate.73 However, the 1898 Act expressly disallowed
"[d]ebts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a district, or a
municipality as a penalty or forfeiture . . . except for the amount of the
pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out of
which the penalty or forfeiture arose."74 This meant that these debts
were not eligible for payment out of the debtor's estate.
The 1898 Act, however, also listed a set of four types of debts
that were categorically nondischargeable, so-called "debts not affected
by a discharge."75 These were: (1) federal, state, and municipal tax
debts; (2) debts stemming from a judgement based on fraud, obtaining
property by false pretenses or willful misrepresentation, or willful and
malicious bodily or property injury; (3) debts that were not "scheduled"
soon enough to permit the creditor the opportunity to prove them per
Section 63; and (4) debts incurred through fraud, embezzlement,
misappropriation, or defalcation of the debtor in his capacity as an
officer or fiduciary.76 Debts owing to federal and state governments,
including penal debts, were not included in the list.77 This omission
71. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 63, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 562-63 (repealed 1978).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 57(d). Creditors could prove their claims by submitting a sworn and signed written
statement describing the claim, the consideration exchanged for the claim, any collateral
securing the debt underpinning the claim, any payments made on the debt, and the actual
amount of the claim (that is, how much the debtor allegedly owed the creditor). Id.
74. Id. § 57(j).
75. Id. § 17.
76. Id.
77. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44 (1986).
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was perhaps consistent with the historical view that debts owing to
the federal sovereign were simply not affected by a bankruptcy
proceeding.78 Yet it was unclear whether this view of
nondischargeability extended to the sovereign states. Nevertheless,
some courts interpreted the 1898 Act to understand the omission of
penal debt from the list of nondischargeable debts to mean that penal
debts owing to both the federal and state sovereigns were
nondischargeable in bankruptcy under this sovereign exception
theory. 7
In In re Moore, the leading case interpreting the treatment of
penal debt under the 1898 Act,80 the District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky heard an appeal from a decision of the
bankruptcy referee81 concluding that a penal debt was discharged in a
bankruptcy proceeding.82 On April 6, 1901, Moore was convicted of
"keeping and maintaining a nuisance in the nature of a disorderly
house" and fined $400.83 Moore filed a bankruptcy petition and was
adjudged bankrupt. The Commonwealth of Kentucky filed a claim for
$400 against the bankruptcy estate, but the bankruptcy trustee
argued that the state's claim was not a provable debt under the 1898
Act. In other words, the claim was neither eligible to be paid from the
estate nor did it survive the discharge.84
The district court concluded that while the plain text of the
1898 Act could support this interpretation, it could not have been
Congress's intention to permit the bankruptcy law to usurp the will of
78. See, e.g., United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. 251, 254 (1873) (concluding that the
government was "not bound by the general words in the insolvent law," and that if Congress
intended to provide for the discharge of a surety bond guaranteeing "the faithful performance of
duty by a public officer," it would have said so expressly in the law); United States v. King, 26 F.
Cas. 788, 790 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 15,536) ("[W]e are of opinion, that debts due to the United
States are not within the provisions of the bankrupt law; but that the debtor, his lands and
effects, present and future, are liable to actions and remedies for the recovery, as before the
passing of [the bankruptcy] act."). The Herron Court further opined that a rule providing for the
discharge of debt owed to the government "would, in all probability, lead to great loss to the
public treasury and to great public embarrassment." Herron, 87 U.S. at 263-64.
79. See In re Moore, 111 F. 145, 147 (W.D. Ky. 1901) ("[I]n the United States the states and
national government are not bound by a general statutory provision whereby any of their
prerogative rights, titles, or interests will be impaired, unless by express words or irresistible
implication.").
80. See id. at 148.
81. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1170-71 (2015) (describing the referee system under the 1898 Act).
82. See In re Moore, 111 F. at 147.
83. Id. at 145-46.
84. Id. at 146.
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the states to impose unavoidable criminal liability.85 For the court,
"[T]o rule otherwise would make the bankrupt court the means of
frustrating proper efforts to enforce criminal statutes enacted for the
public welfare."86 Moreover, the court opined that: "The provisions of
the bankrupt act have reference alone to civil liabilities, as demands
between debtor and creditor, as such, and not to punishments inflicted
pro bono publico for crimes committed."87 Thus, the court reinstated
the debt, concluding that only an express legislative act could properly
limit the rights and interests of the sovereign, here the state.88
Not all contemporary courts adopted the In re Moore court's
approach. Two years before, in In re Alderson, the District Court for
West Virginia considered "whether or not a judgment obtained by a
state upon a criminal prosecution is a provable debt, and, if so,
whether or not the state has a prior lien upon the estate of the
bankrupt."89 The debtor in that case owed fines imposed upon his
conviction for unlawful retailing. The court noted that because Section
63 clearly defined a provable debt in terms of whether the liability was
"evidenced by a judgment," Alderson's penal debt, which was
established by a criminal judgment, fell into this category.90 In
addition, the court concluded that Section 17's explicit reference to
governmental debts, namely tax debt, as being nondischargeable
suggested that Congress did not intend to accord similar treatment to
any other category of debt owed to a government entity, including
penal debt.91 Thus, Alderson's penal debt was discharged. The In re
Moore court's approach took hold, however, and the majority of courts
considering the issue concluded that penal debt was nondischargeable
in bankruptcy. Congress ultimately followed suit, codifying this
interpretation in Section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 ("Bankruptcy Code"), which replaced the 1898 Act.
2. Kelly v. Robinson
Less than ten years after the passage of the Bankruptcy Code,
the Supreme Court decided Kelly v. Robinson,92 which extended the
85. Id. at 149 ("It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of the bankrupt act, if only the
letter of those provisions be looked to, would embrace such judgments as the one referred to; but
it is well settled that there may be cases in which such literal construction is not admissible.").
86. Id. at 150.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. In re Alderson, 98 F. 588, 589 (D.W. Va. 1899) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
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reach of Section 523(a)(7) to state restitution obligations. In Kelly,
Carolyn Robinson was convicted of welfare fraud in Connecticut after
she wrongfully received approximately $9,000 in welfare benefits. The
state court imposed a suspended prison sentence and five years of
probation. As a condition of her probation, Robinson was required to
pay restitution to the state Office of Adult Probation, paying $100 per
month for the entire five-year term of her probation.93 The next year,
Robinson filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in which she listed the
restitution obligation as a debt. Despite being notified by the
bankruptcy court of the filing, the state probation agency did not file a
proof of claim or an objection to the discharge of the restitution
obligation. The bankruptcy court granted a discharge to Robinson, at
which point Robinson had paid just $450 in restitution.
Three years later, after Robinson received a letter from the
state probation office indicating that it considered the restitution
obligation to be nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code,
Robinson returned to the bankruptcy court seeking a declaration that
the restitution obligation was in fact discharged.94 The bankruptcy
court sided with the state probation office, reasoning that the
restitution obligation was not a "debt" as defined under the Code and
that even if it was a debt, it was a nondischargeable criminal fine or
fee under Section 523(a)(7). The district court affirmed, adopting the
bankruptcy court's reasoning, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. Like the In re Alderson court, the appeals court reasoned
that the restitution obligation was merely a "debt" under the Code and
that the state probation office waived its opportunity to collect on its
debt from the bankruptcy estate by not filing either a claim or an
objection to the discharge.95
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, expressing
"serious doubts" about whether Congress meant to include criminal
penalties in the Code's general definition of debt.96 In reaching its
decision, the Court described the statutory treatment of criminal fines
and penalties in the 1898 Act. The Court noted that as a textual
matter, "the most natural construction of the [1898] Act ... would
have allowed criminal fines and penalties to be discharged in
bankruptcy."97 Yet notwithstanding the "clear statutory language,"
the Court noted that most lower courts subsequently declined to
93. Id. at 39-41.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 42-43.
96. Id. at 50.
97. Id. at 44-45.
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discharge criminal fines and penalties in order to avoid interfering
with the states' ability to enforce their criminal laws98 and extended
this reasoning to restitution obligations that were imposed as a part of
a criminal sentence.99 Thus, the Court observed, Congress passed the
Bankruptcy Code "against the background of an established judicial
exception to discharge for criminal sentences, including restitution
orders" notwithstanding that the statute was "drafted with
considerable care and specificity."100
Ultimately, the Kelly Court decided that it did not need to
reach the question of whether a restitution obligation was a "debt"
under the Bankruptcy Code, and it held that Section 523(a)(7) itself
"preserves from discharge any condition a state criminal court imposes
as part of a criminal sentence," including Kelly's probation-based
restitution obligation.101 The Court rooted its decision largely in
federalism concerns, specifically its determination to keep bankruptcy
law from interfering with the penal objectives and interests of the
states. Consequently, notwithstanding the traditional compensatory
nature of restitution, Justice Powell wrote that "the decision to impose
restitution generally does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the
penal goals of the State and the situation of the defendant."102
Justice Marshall dissented from the majority's opinion on two
grounds. First, he argued that restitution, even though partly penal in
nature, is patently pecuniary in nature because it is "intended to
compensate victims for their injuries," and to restore "the victim as far
as possible, to the position that [he] would have been in if the original
criminal act had never occurred."103 Thus, the restitution obligation at
issue was imposed merely as "compensation for actual pecuniary loss"
to the state agency and was dischargeable under the express language
of Section 523(a)(7).104 Second, Justice Marshall agreed with the lower
court that the restitution obligation was merely a "debt" under the
Bankruptcy Code for which the state probation office had a right to
payment. He reasoned that in passing the Bankruptcy Code, Congress
meant to provide a broad and "meaningful discharge" to debtors, citing
legislative history that showed that, in its passage of the Bankruptcy
Code, Congress hoped to rectify the "incomplete" relief afforded to
98. Id. at 45-46.
99. Id. at 46.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 52.




debtors under the 1898 Act.105 For Justice Marshall then, "Congress
plainly intended that fines, penalties, and forfeitures be deemed debts
eligible to participate in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, and
the statute provides explicitly for that participation."10 6
3. Post-Kelly Jurisprudence and Statutory Amendment
As one commentator noted, the Kelly Court "[e]ssentially ...
found [nondischargeability of fines, penalties, and civil forfeiture
under Section 523(a)(7)] satisfied by a single factor-characterization
of the debtor's obligation as a penal sanction."107 Indeed, many courts
have interpreted Kelly broadly to mean that any financial obligation
imposed as part of a sentence or in accordance with a judgment is
nondischargeable even if, as a textual matter, the obligation does not
meet the requirements of Section 523(a)(7).108 For example, restitution
obligations that are payable to private individuals (rather than
payable to and for the benefit of the governmental entity)109 and some
"usage fees"110 (like the actual cost of prosecution that are not on their
face a fine, penalty, or a forfeiture) are nondischargeable in some
jurisdictions.111
For example, in Richmond v. New Hampshire Supreme Court
Committee on Professional Conduct, a New Hampshire attorney was
disciplined for violating the state's rules of professional conduct.112 He
was sanctioned and ordered to reimburse the state committee on
professional conduct for the actual cost of bringing the disciplinary
proceedings. Richmond filed a Chapter 7 petition, and the state
committee on professional conduct sought to have the debt declared
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(7). Both the bankruptcy court
and the district court concluded that the costs were nondischargeable,
and the First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.113 In reaching its
105. Id. at 56-57 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 180 (1977)).
106. See id. at 58.
107. See Howard, supra note 13, at 39.
108. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Gi Nam (In re Gi Nam), 273 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir.
2001) ("Kelly, therefore, stands for the proposition that § 523(a)(7) excepts from dischargeability
some penal sanctions that technically are neither fines nor penalties nor forfeitures.").
109. Troff v. Utah (In re Troff), 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Kelly, 479 U.S.
at 53).
110. See Developments in the Law-Policing, supra note 1, at 1727 (describing usage fees in
the criminal context, including arrest, adjudication, and incarceration costs).
111. See, e.g., Richmond v. N.H. Supreme Court Comm. on Prof'1 Conduct, 542 F.3d 913, 920
(1st Cir. 2008) (listing cases reaching this result in the attorney discipline context); see also State
Bar of Cal. v. Findley (In re Findley), 593 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010).
112. Richmond, 542 F.3d at 915.
113. See id. at 916-18.
936 [Vol. 70:3:917
DISCHARGING PENAL DEBT
decision, the court of appeals noted that it was "irrelevant that the
New Hampshire Supreme Court has, in other contexts, stated that
attorney disciplinary proceedings are not, strictly speaking, punitive
in nature."114 Instead, the court reasoned that even though the cost
imposed represented the actual amount of money that the state spent
in Richmond's case, the amount was nonetheless more punitive than
pecuniary because its primary purpose was "to deter attorney
misconduct, protect the public and to rehabilitate the attorney."115
Accordingly, the costs were similar in nature to the restitution
obligation at issue in Kelly and consequently nondischargeable under
Section 523(a)(7).116
Other courts have taken a more textual approach to Section
523(a)(7) after Kelly, limiting its reach notwithstanding that the debt
incurred was rooted in the court's intention to punish the debtor. In
Hughes v. Sanders, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether damages stemming from a malpractice judgment against an
attorney, which were calculated based on actual loss and payable to
the private plaintiff, were nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(7).117
In the underlying malpractice action, the district court had found the
attorney-defendant in contempt of court for "abus[ing] the judicial
process" and had imposed the judgment with some penal motivation to
vindicate the integrity of the court.118 The court of appeals
"reluctantly" concluded that even though "the judgment [wa]s a
default judgment entered by the district court in part as a sanction for
Sanders's inexcusable and unprofessional conduct[, that fact did] not
change the judgment's compensatory character."119 Thus, the debt was
not excepted from discharge under Section 523(a)(7).
For its part, Congress has signaled its approval of Kelly by
broadening the scope of nondischargeability of penal debt in Chapter
7. As a part of the sweeping Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress made restitution obligations
114. Id. at 918. The court opined that the state supreme court likely chose not to
characterize the disciplinary proceedings as criminal because "enhanced due process protections
and notice requirements would likely apply, a result that the New Hampshire Supreme Court
might wish to avoid." Id.
115. Id. at 921.
116. Id.; see also U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of
Va., Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that "so long as the government's interest
in enforcing a debt is penal, it makes no difference that injured persons may thereby receive
compensation for pecuniary loss" (emphasis omitted)).
117. 469 F.3d 475, 479 (6th Cir. 2006).
118. Hughes v. Sanders, No. 204CV744, 2005 VL 1490534, at *1 (S.D. Ohio June 23, 2005),
aff'd, 469 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2006).
119. Hughes, 469 F.3d at 479.
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imposed for violations under Title 18 expressly nondischargeable.120
Unlike fines, penalties, and forfeitures in Section 523(a)(7), this new
Section 523(a)(13) does not require any inquiry into whether the
government or a private party is the payee or beneficiary of the
restitution or whether the restitution is compensatory in nature.
Thus, as a textual matter, all federal restitution obligations imposed
under Title 18 are expressly nondischargeable in bankruptcy.121
Congress, however, did not codify Kelly's holding to make state
restitution obligations expressly nondischargeable.
To a lesser degree, penal debt is nondischargeable in Chapter
13 as well. In exchange for committing some of their future income to
the repayment of their debts, Chapter 13 filers are able to discharge
some debts that are nondischargeable in a Chapter 7.122 Thus, the
range of nondischargeable debts in Chapter 13 is smaller than in
Chapter 7 due to this so-called "superdischarge" available to Chapter
13 filers.123 Nondischargeability, however, still factors into a Chapter
13 proceeding. Per Section 1328(a), Chapter 13 filers cannot discharge
several of the debts listed in Section 523(a), including certain tax
debts;124 debts incurred through false pretense, false representation,
or fraud;1 2 5 domestic support obligations;1 26 student loans to the extent
they are nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding;127 and a
"restitution, or a criminal fine, included in a sentence on the debtor's
conviction of a crime."128
Restitution obligations were not initially excluded from
discharge in Chapter 13. In Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare v. Davenport, the Supreme Court considered whether a
criminal restitution obligation was dischargeable under Section
1328(a).129 The Davenports were convicted of welfare fraud and
120. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(13) (2012) ("A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... for any payment of
an order of restitution issued under title 18, United States Code."); Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat
1796.
121. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, ¶ 523.13.
122. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Statutory
Bankruptcy Reform, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 169, 173 (2005). Professor Jacoby points out, however,
that after the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, "[diebtors who finish chapter 13
repayment plans no longer will have earned a substantially broader 'superdischarge' than
chapter 7 debtors." Id.
123. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2012).




128. Id. § 1328(a)(3).
129. See Pa. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
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ordered to pay restitution to the state probation department, who
would then forward those payments to the Pennsylvania Department
of Welfare, the victim of the Davenports' fraud. The Davenports filed a
Chapter 13 petition and sought a declaration that the restitution
obligation was dischargeable. The state agencies did not file a claim,
and the bankruptcy court approved the Davenports' Chapter 13 plan,
which included the restitution debt as a dischargeable debt.130
The Supreme Court held that the restitution obligation was
dischargeable in the Chapter 13 proceeding.131 Leaving Kelly intact,
Justice Marshall, who had dissented in Kelly, took a textual approach
to conclude that Congress did not intend to limit the discharge of
criminal restitution in Chapter 13 to the same extent that it
apparently did in Chapter 7. He reasoned that the restitution at issue
was merely a "debt," as that is defined under the Bankruptcy Code1 32
as a "liability on a claim."133 And a "claim" is defined as a "right to
payment."134 Justice Marshall reasoned that, unlike in Kelly, where
the Court decided that Section 523(a)(7) dischargeability turned on
the purpose of the obligation (i.e., whether the legal financial
obligation is imposed for a penal purpose), here "the language
employed to define 'claim' in [the Code] makes no reference to
purpose."'35 Justice Marshall further reasoned that, while pre-Code
judicial practice supported the Kelly Court's conclusion that Section
523(a)(7) nondischargeability applies to all obligations imposed in any
part for a penal purpose, Congress intended to limit the exceptions to
discharge applicable in a Chapter 13 case by offering Chapter 13 filers
access to the superdischarge in exchange for the repayment of some of
their debts in a Chapter 13 plan.136 Thus, for Justice Marshall, the
superdischarge, coupled with the Code's broad definition of debt,
indicated Congress's intent to make restitution obligations
dischargeable under Chapter 13.137
Justice Marshall was mistaken. Congress immediately
superseded Davenport a few months after it was decided, amending
Section 1328(a) to make nondischargeable, "any debt for restitution
130. Id. at 555-57.
131. Id. at 564.
132. Id. at 557-60.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2012).
134. Id. § 101(5)(A).
135. See Davenport, 495 U.S. at 559.
136. Id. at 563-64 ("Congress secured a broader discharge for debtors under Chapter 13
than Chapter 7 by extending to Chapter 13 proceedings some, but not all, of § 523(a)'s exceptions
to discharge.").
137. Id. at 564.
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included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime."138
Congress further expanded the scope of nondischargeable penal debt
by adding "criminal fine[s]" to Section 1328(a) in 1994.139
4. Framing Penal Debt as Nondischargeable
As described above, penal debt of all stripes is largely
nondischargeable in consumer bankruptcy. This treatment has
similarly been justified with reference to the public policy and
misconduct concerns as complemented by further reference to
federalism principles. In this last Subsection, I describe the operation
of those frames in the specific context of penal debt before critiquing
them in Part IV.
The public's interest in punishment, deterrence, and the
rehabilitation of law-breakers has served as an important reason why
penal debt should not be discharged in bankruptcy.140 The In re Moore
court articulated this view in reaching its conclusion that the penal
fine at issue was nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Even though, by
the court's own admission, the 1898 Act was equivocal on the issue as
a textual matter. The court opined: "It seems to me that to rule [that
the debt was dischargeable in bankruptcy] would make the bankrupt
court the means of frustrating proper efforts to enforce criminal
statutes enacted for the public welfare."141 For the In re Moore court, it
was wrongheaded to conclude that Congress would have sanctioned
federal bankruptcy law interfering with the well-being of the public in
this way. 142
Similarly, in Kelly, the Supreme Court expressed concern that
a pro-discharge interpretation of the statute would impinge on the
state's prerogative to serve the public interest through economic
sanctions. The Court worried that the prospect of discharge of penal
debt might force a state prosecutor "to defend state criminal
judgments in federal bankruptcy court."143 The Court reasoned:
This prospect, in turn, would hamper the flexibility of state criminal judges in choosing
the combination of imprisonment, fines, and restitution most likely to further the
rehabilitative and deterrent goals of state criminal justice systems. We do not think
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (2012); The Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4820 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 10606) (enacted as part of the
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789).
139. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (adding "or a
criminal fine" to the language of Section 1328(a)(3)).
140. See, e.g., Love v. Scott (In re Love), 442 B.R. 868, 872 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011).
141. In re Moore, 111 F. 145, 150 (W.D. Ky. 1901).
142. Id.
143. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986).
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Congress lightly would limit the rehabilitative and deterrent options available to state
criminal judges.1 4 4
Further, in characterizing the restitution obligation at issue
there as essentially penal in nature (if not technically so because it
was calculated based on the actual amount fraudulently received by
the debtor), the Court focused on the public's interest in all aspects of
a judgment. It was appropriate to view the restitution order as non-
pecuniary because "criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests
in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's desire for
compensation."145 Moreover, "restitution orders imposed in such
proceedings operate 'for the benefit of the State" and "are not assessed
'for . . . compensation' of the victim" as is required for
nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(7).1 4 6 The Court thus
concluded that because "[tihe sentence following a criminal conviction
necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative interests of the
State[, t]hose interests are sufficient to place restitution orders within
the meaning of § 523(a)(7)."14 7
Other courts have followed this focus on public policy. For
example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals relied on public policy in
holding that the costs of an attorney ethics proceeding were
nondischargeable. In Richmond v. New Hampshire Supreme Court
Commission on Professional Conduct, the costs associated with the
attorney disciplinary proceeding at issue were by statute calculable
based on the actual amount that the state supreme court spent in its
action against the debtor.148 Nonetheless, the court rejected the
debtor's argument that the debt was pecuniary (and so dischargeable
under the plain terms of Section 523(a)(7)). The court reasoned that
costs associated with "quasi-criminal"1 4 9 attorney disciplinary actions
are nondischargeable because "deterrence, rehabilitation and
protection of the public" motivate these actions.15 0 Thus, even though
the court acknowledged that the New Hampshire Supreme Court had
itself stated that "attorney disciplinary proceedings are not, strictly
speaking, punitive in nature,"15 1 the court concluded that "[i]t is clear
that the costs assessed in New Hampshire disciplinary proceedings
are not 'purely compensatory,'" and the "cost assessments erve both
144. Id. at 49-50.
145. Id. at 52-53.
146. Id. at 53 (alteration in original).
147. Id.
148. See 542 F.3d 913 (1st Cir. 2008).
149. Id. at 919.
150. Id. at 920.
151. Id. at 918.
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to deter attorney misconduct and to help rehabilitate wayward
attorneys."152
Finally, moral concerns about limiting the discharge privilege
to honest debtors who have not incurred their debt through some
misconduct have also guided the analysis of the penal debt exception
to discharge. Honesty is an important general value in consumer
bankruptcy, and it is axiomatic in bankruptcy policy that the privilege
of a discharge is not available to the dishonest debtor.153 Historical
views of people who could not pay their debts were that those debtors
were moral failures and/or had engaged in some misconduct that
brought them to their present destitute condition. 154 Thus, bankruptcy
law initially developed as a means of assisting creditors in collecting
their due from these perceived reprobates and equalizing distribution
amongst similarly situated creditors, with little to no concern for the
well-being of the debtor.155 On this view, the honesty of the debtor in
the administration of the proceeding was particularly important
because the debtor's candor was integral to ensure that creditors
received their due under the law from the debtor's estate.156
Complete disregard for the debtor's welfare, however, was not
conducive to an efficient recovery for the debtor's creditors. As it
became apparent that the bankruptcy proceeding would go much
better if the debtor was cooperative, some concession to the debtor was
necessary to encourage candid participation.15 7 Hence, the discharge of
debts developed in part as a carrot offered to the debtor in exchange
152. Id. at 920 ("Rehabilitation and deterrence are the same public functions that were at
issue in Kelly.").
153. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) ("[I]n the same breath that we
have invoked this 'fresh start' policy, we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the
opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate
debtor.'"); Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical
Significance, but Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV 229,
239 (2002) ("Providing a discharge to honest and unfortunate debtors has long been understood
to be an important function of our bankruptcy system.").
154. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Mortgage Modification, Equitable Subordination, and the
Honest but Unfortunate Creditor, 79 FORDHAM L. REV 1599, 1613-16 (2011).
155. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 857 (1982), revised and reprinted in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY:
EcoNOIc AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 39, 39 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds.,
1966) ("[T]his discharge-centered view of bankruptcy is correct neither from an historical
perspective nor from a realistic appraisal of the presence and operation of most of the provisions
in the federal bankruptcy laws over the years.").
156. See Moringiello, supra note 154, at 1613.
157. See Emily Kadens, The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in the
Development of Bankruptcy Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1308 (2010) ("Modern American bankruptcy
has largely solved the cooperation problem by ... increasing the availability of discharge . . . .").
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for the debtor's candid participation.15 8 And, in the Bankruptcy Code,
the debtor's honesty and candor in the bankruptcy proceeding itself
remains a prerequisite to a dischargel5 9 along with honesty at the
time that the debt was incurred.160 With respect to the latter, only
those debtors who find themselves in financial distress,
notwithstanding purportedly honest behavior, can get relief from the
bankruptcy court. 161
Understood through this lens, Section 523(a)(7) purports to
limit discharge on debt incurred through misconduct as evidenced by
liability for breaking the law. In other words, Congress and courts
have relied on actual liability for misconduct as a proxy for dishonesty
with respect to criminal and civil fines, penalties, and forfeitures.162
As explained by one court: "[B]ecause discharge in bankruptcy is not
intended to be a haven for wrongdoers, [debtors] may not discharge 'a
fine, penalty or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit, and [that] is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss[.]' "163 Thus, misconduct forms an important basis for
the current treatment of penal debt in bankruptcy.
Federalism principles have also animated nondischargeability
policy related to penal debt. For example, the In re Moore court
refused to conclude that federal bankruptcy law could supplant the
state's desire to sanction behavior that the state deemed inconsistent
with the best interests of its constituents.16 4 And federalism concerns
similarly underpinned the Court's decision in Kelly to expand the
158. See Moringiello, supra note 154, at 1613-16.
159. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(a)(7), (d) (2012); Moringiello, supra note 154, at 1613; see e.g.,
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007) (denying a debtor the right to convert
his case from a Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 proceeding because he had misrepresented the value
of his home during the proceeding).
160. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (permitting court to deny a discharge for cause); see also
Moringiello, supra note 154, at 1612-16 ('The Code's sections are explicit in requiring both
administrative and moral compliance from the debtor, thus granting relief only to the 'honest but
unfortunate' debtor.").
161. Moringiello, supra note 154, at 1615 ("[T]here is some bad behavior that renders a
debtor unworthy of bankruptcy relief.").
162. Ryan v. United States (In re Ryan), 389 B.R. 710, 713 (9th Cir. 2008):
A second, countervailing policy consideration is a historic deference, both in the
Bankruptcy Code and in the administration of prior bankruptcy law, to excepting
criminal sanctions from discharge in bankruptcy. Application of this policy is
consistent with a general recognition that, "[t]he principal purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code is to grant a 'fresh start' to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.'"
(quoting Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367 (emphasis omitted)).
163. U.S. Dep't. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64
F.3d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1995) (third and fourth brackets in original).
164. In re Moore, 111 F. 145, 150 (W.D. Ky. 1901).
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reach of nondischargeability in Chapter 7.165 The Court cited Younger
v. Harris for the proposition that bankruptcy law should not authorize
federal courts to interfere with state criminal judgments, including
restitution obligations.166 In Younger, the Court considered whether a
federal court could enjoin a state criminal prosecution where the
defendant argued that the state law under which he was being
prosecuted was unconstitutional as a matter of federal law.167 The
Court did not decide the case under the Anti-Injunction Act, which
prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings except
under a limited set of circumstances, including where Congress has
expressly authorized such intervention. 168 Instead, the Younger Court
decided that the injunction sought by Harris was unjustified as a
matter of "Our Federalism."1 6 9 Thus, the Younger Court declined to
parse the language of the apparently relevant statute in favor of
relying on a more general policy of deference to state court
proceedings.
The Kelly Court similarly declined to take a textual approach
to decide whether the restitution obligation at issue was a "debt"
under the Bankruptcy Code and whether it was nondischargeable per
the plain terms of the statute. Instead, the Court stated:
Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis for this judicial exception, a
deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state
criminal proceedings. The right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an
important aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States. This Court has emphasized
repeatedly the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal
prosecutions.170
The Court dismissed the debtor's argument that the restitution
obligation at issue was dischargeable for a technical reason, namely
because the state did not enter an objection to the discharge of the
debt. 171 The Court reasoned that this interpretation of bankruptcy law
would unduly "force state prosecutors to defend state criminal
judgments in federal bankruptcy court" and "[i]n some cases . .. lead
165. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986); see also Casey & Huq, supra note 81, at
1184 (noting that "[b]ankruptcy legislation has long raised federalism concerns"); David A. Skeel,
Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEv. J. 321, 330-34 (1999) (describing
how federalism helped to shape the 1898 Act).
166. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 46-47 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)).
167. 401 U.S. at 38-41.
168. Id. at 54.
169. Id. at 43-44.
170. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 46) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
171. Id. at 49.
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to federal remission of judgments imposed by state criminal judges."172
This outcome was untenable, and the Court relied on the general
purpose and goals of the statute rather than reach a conclusion
seemingly mandated by the text of the statute.173
III. ASSESSING NONDISCHARGEABILITY'S ANALYTICAL FRAMES
On the surface, the public policy, misconduct, and/or federalism
frames seem a reasonable normative justification as to why certain
debts should be singled out for the exceptional treatment of categorical
nondischargeability, even though such treatment might frustrate the
fresh start principle. Yet, their value as a guiding light is deceptive for
at least two reasons. First, on closer view, these frames offer an
unintelligible means of understanding why as a conceptual matter
some debts are categorically nondischargeable and why others are
dischargeable. This is reflected by the fact that there is no satisfying
distinction between currently nondischargeable debts and other debts
that seem to implicate the very same misconduct, public policy, and/or
federalism concerns, yet are readily dischargeable. In other words, the
existing analytical framing of nondischargeability provides no account
of why similar debts are treated dissimilarly along this dimension.
Second, as an internal matter, in some circumstances these frames
have been deployed simplistically, without reference to the sometimes
complex set of circumstances under which that crushing debt might
arise. This, in turn, limits bankruptcy relief for those debtors who find
themselves carrying crushing yet nondischargeable debt. For this
reason, we might consider rethinking our current nondischargeability
policy in order to better align bankruptcy policy with its own
normative orientation: the fresh start. This would require careful
consideration of and accounting for any unintended consequences from
a change in the nondischargeability rules.
A. Misconduct, Public Policy, and Federalism and Dischargeability
Some debts that implicate the same misconduct, public policy,
and/or federalism concerns as penal debt or student loan debt are
nonetheless fully dischargeable. For example, debts stemming from
environmental harms like toxic dumping are dischargeable in a
bankruptcy proceeding.174 This is so even though environmental
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Stanley M. Spracker & James D. Barnette, The Treatment of Environmental
Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANIR. DEV. J. 85, 88 (1995).
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harms and consequent financial liability implicate both the public
policy frame-especially to the extent that "[i]mplicit in the
environmental laws and paramount in the minds of their enforcers is
the notion that economic enterprises must bear the external costs of
environmental and public health protection"175-and the misconduct
frame. Nevertheless, these debts would only be nondischargeable to
the extent that an environmental judgment-creditor could shoehorn
her claim into an existing category of nondischargeable debt, such as
those stemming from willful and malicious injury to property.
For example, in Ohio v. Kovacs, the state of Ohio appealed a
judgment by the lower courts that a cleanup order, as then converted
to a payment obligation, was dischargeable in bankruptcy.176 William
Kovacs, the CEO of Chem-Dyne, "a 10-acre toxic waste dump
classified by the government as the worst environmental hazard in
Ohio and one of the worst in the nation,"177 settled by stipulation and
judgment entry a lawsuit brought by the state of Ohio alleging
violations of state environmental laws.178 Kovacs, who was personally
liable, did not comply with the terms of the settlement, and the state
court appointed a receiver to seize both the site and Kovacs's assets.
Kovacs then filed a bankruptcy petition to stay the actions of the
receiver, preventing the seizure of his personal assets.179 As neither
side argued that the obligation fell within the list of exceptions to
discharge under Section 523(a), the Court considered whether the
judgment order was a "debt," defined as a "liability on a claim," and
therefore eligible for discharge in bankruptcy. The Court concluded
that "there is little doubt that the State had the right to an equitable
remedy under state law and that the right [was] reduced to judgment
in the form of an injunction ordering the cleanup."180 The Court
affirmed the appellate court's conclusion that the cleanup order as
then converted into an obligation to pay money was in fact a "claim"
and thus dischargeable in bankruptcy. 181 This was so even though the
bankruptcy discharge came after Kovacs's misconduct led to his
environmental liability. Accordingly, one might conclude that public
175. Id. at 87.
176. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
177. Penny Chorlton, Hamilton, Ohio, Struggles with Massive Toxic Waste Cleanup, WASH.
POST. (Nov. 3, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/11/03/hamilton-ohio-
struggles-with-massive-toxic-waste-cleanup/9144394a-5814-4cc7-afef-8be8695b25ac/?utm-term=
.d7e5d2993e53 [https://perma.cclJF8U-FCRE].
178. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276-77.
179. Id. at 276.
180. Id. at 278-79.
181. Id. at 283.
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policy should mandate that individuals who cause such extreme
external effects should not be free to discharge debt related to those
harms, in part because the discharge frustrates the state's interests in
regulating environmental harms within its borders.
This outcome epitomizes the inconsistency of the misconduct,
public policy, and/or federalism framing of exceptions to discharge. It
is unclear why debt stemming from environmental liability would be
subject to discharge while penal debt is not when, as a matter of
misconduct, public policy, and federalism, these categories of debt
seem very similar. Indeed, contemporaneous accounts of the reckless
behavior of Chem-Dyne and the resulting damage to local
communities counsel in favor of nondischargeability.182 Yet,
bankruptcy law embraces one debt in its fresh start orientation and
excludes the other.
Liability stemming from negligent and reckless tortious
conduct arguably similarly implicates the misconduct, public policy,
and federalism frames, yet unlike penal debts, these debts are readily
dischargeable. For example, in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, the respondent-
debtor filed for bankruptcy after a state court found him liable for
medical malpractice.183 In addition to the substandard care the
respondent provided, he did not carry malpractice insurance that
would have compensated the victim of his malpractice, whose leg was
amputated above the knee as a result of the respondent's actions. The
Court decided that liability stemming from negligent or reckless
conduct was dischargeable in bankruptcy and that only liability from
an intentional tort was categorically nondischargeable.184 This, even
though the case implicated the debtor's misconduct in incurring the
debt, public policy regarding deterrence and more, and the state's
interests in regulating the conduct of its medical professionals and
compensating individuals from tortious conduct.
Thus, the juxtaposition of categorically nondischargeable penal
debt and dischargeable environmental and tort liability exemplifies
how the existing misconduct/public policy/federalism framework does
little work to shed light on this divide between debts that look alike
from a certain vantage point.
182. See, e.g., Chorlton, supra note 177:
The Environmental Protection Agency says that unknown thousands of gallons were
poured into massive open-air tanks and allowed to evaporate, broken open with
pickaxes and left to drain or leak into the ground, or, as a last resort, tipped into the
nearby Great Miami River, via a conveniently located canal.
183. 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
184. Id. at 61-64.
2017] 947
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. Flawed Deployment of the Nondischargeability Frames
The misconduct, public policy, and federalism frames also
suffer from the overly simplistic way in which they have been
deployed in complicated situations involving unmanageable debt.
Penal debt again provides a lens into the diminished value of these
frames as a mechanism for understanding why the fresh start
principle should be subordinated in favor of a categorical approach to
nondischargeability. Specifically, these frames do not make sense
when considered in the context of the evolution of economic sanctions
and other legal financial obligations as a state/local government
funding mechanism and the regressive effects of these funding
arrangements. As described below, this reality undermines existing
public policy/misconduct/federalism framing particularly insofar as it
subordinates the fresh start principle for a socioeconomic group
struggling under the weight of unmanageable debt.
Penal debt is a particularly destructive problem borne of a
complex set of social challenges. Profit-motivated justice systems,
together with other defects in the justice system, leave entire
communities of politically alienated and disempowered individuals in
the throes of unmanageable debt spirals. Yet, premised on reference to
simplified characterizations of misconduct, public policy, or
federalism, bankruptcy law offers no relief, even though its normative
mandate is to provide the debtor with a fresh start.185 Indeed, in light
of the expansion of economic sanctions and their use for nontraditional
purposes related to government funding, paired with the reality of
Ferguson-style administration of justice that focuses its crosshairs on
the most vulnerable and economically disenfranchised individuals and
communities, the existing nondischargeability analytical frames have
little meaningful application.
The public policy rationale has resulted in an unduly under-
inclusive bankruptcy policy vis-it-vis penal debt. With respect to
punishment, assuming that proponents of deterrence theory are
correct about the deterrent effect of sanctions, penal fees that are
assessed for relatively innocuous violations of the law, like having too-
tall grass, and that target poor and disenfranchised individuals
because they are poor and disenfranchised, likely do little to deter
misconduct in the traditional sense.186 These fees are unlikely to
185. See Jackson, supra note 10.
186. There is, of course, a well-developed literature on the virtues and failings of deterrence
as a meaningful concept in criminal and civil liability. For the purposes of this Article, I assume
that proponents of deterrence theory are correct about the deterrent effects of sanctions. See, e.g.,
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 425 (1999):
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achieve any of the goals of punishment because what they are truly
punishing is poverty. Even a relatively low fine, if unaffordable, can
result in catastrophic outcomes particularly when further punishment
is meted out for the failure to pay those fines. In the same vein, there
are no meaningful rehabilitative benefits when the practical result of
incurring a penal fee is being too poor to pay the fine. In other words,
while the core concern underlying the public policy rationale might
make sense in some cases of criminal and civil fines, in other cases-
such as where there is a court fee imposed to make up a shortfall in
funding-the nondischargeability of penal debt achieves limited public
benefit and instead unduly removes an important option that could
address a significant debt problem that disproportionately affects poor
people. 187
Similarly, the misconduct rationale tracks notions of morality
that do not account for problems with justice systems, such as the rise
of profit-motivated over-regulation. Examples include the civil and
criminal prohibition of relatively innocuous behavior, as exemplified
by the "Manner of Walking in Roadway" violation in the Ferguson
Municipal Code.188 In that regard, current deficiencies in the criminal
and civil justice system show that it is too simplistic a
characterization to view alike every individual found liable for
breaking the law as having engaged in misconduct. Indeed, many
fines and penalties derive from civil offenses where morality and
honesty have limited application. For example, in the case of Edward
Brown of Jennings, Missouri, his fault was staying in his home of
twenty-five years after the city had condemned it and letting his grass
grow too high. It is likely that he did not comply with the law because,
Deterrence theorists typically assess the efficiency of a punishment for its
contribution both to "general deterrence," which refers to the effect that punishing a
particular offender has on the behavior of the population generally, and to "specific
deterrence," which refers to the impact of a punishment on the offender's own
behavior, a usage that brings the aim of incapacitation within the ambit of deterrence
broadly understood.
But see id. at 418 ("[B]y leaching the meaning out of criminal law, deterrence rhetoric
extinguishes a powerful resource for reshaping the social norms that construct unjust systems of
status and privilege.").
187. See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts,
62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 775-76 (2010) (noting that in other contexts, bankruptcy courts often
"resolve difficult, politically fraught disputes").
188. See Complaint at 1 88, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180 (E.D. Mo.




rather than being essentially dishonest, he had nowhere else to live
but in that broken-down dwelling on his limited income. 189
Selective and discriminatory enforcement in federal, state, and
municipal justice systems also complicates the reliance on overly
simplified and formalistic notions of misconduct based on civil and
criminal liability. The Ferguson Report observed that "Ferguson's law
enforcement practices overwhelmingly impact African Americans."190
While African Americans made up sixty-seven percent of the
population of Ferguson, between 2012 and 2014, they accounted for
"85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of arrests."91
Moreover, the Report also observed that the Ferguson Police
Department "appears to bring certain offenses almost exclusively
against African Americans," such as "Manner of Walking in Roadway,"
which carries a $302 fine and "Failure to Comply," which carries a
$527 fine.192
Professor Michelle Alexander has also described the degree to
which race has unduly played a factor in who has been arrested and
charged in the War on Drugs.193 She describes how over-policing and
the effective criminalization of poverty that developed in the wake of
the War on Drugs disproportionately affected people of color.194 Thus,
"[a)lthough the majority of illegal drug users and dealers nationwide
are white, three-fourths of all imprisoned for drug offenses have been
189. See Joseph Shapiro, Jail Time for Unpaid Court Fines and Fees Can Create Cycle of
Poverty, NASHVILLE PUB. RADIO (Feb. 9, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/
2015/02/09/384968360/jail-time-for-unpaid-court-fines-and-fees-can-create-cycle-of-poverty
[https://perma.cc/8LE4-PRZ5]; see also Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet on
White House and Justice Department Convening-A Cycle of Incarceration: Prison, Debt and
Bail Practices (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/fact-sheet-white-house-and-justice-
department-convening-cycle-incarceration-prison-debt-and [https://perma.cc/VM8D-FC6Z] ("Low-
income individuals with criminal justice debts may face difficult tradeoffs between paying their
debt and purchasing other necessities, and those unable to pay can face incarceration,
demonstrating the large human cost of these policies as well."). See generally Roopal Patel &
Meghna Philip, Criminal Justice Debt: A Toolkit for Action, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2012),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Criminal%20Justice%2ODe
bt%20Background%20for%20web.pdf [http://perma.cc/GL5W-QRR9].
190. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 4 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson-police-department report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8AY-VG6M]
[hereinafter Ferguson Report]; see also Campbell Robertson, A City Where Policing,
Discrimination and Revenue Raising Went Hand in Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 03/05/us/us-details-a-persistent-pattern-of-police-discrimination-
in-a-small-missouri-city.html?r =0 [https://perma.cclVTR2-3HA7].
191. See Ferguson Report, supra note 190, at 4.
192. See Ferguson Complaint, supra note 188, at 1 88; Ferguson Report, supra note 190, at
4.
193. See ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 97-154.
194. Id. at 98-100.
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black[] or Latino[ ]."195 Alexander further points out that police
enforcement of the explosion of federal and state drug laws that took
place in the 1980s and 1990s was directed "almost exclusively in poor
communities of color, resulting in jaw-dropping numbers of African
Americans and Latinos filling our nation's prisons and jails every
year."196 This selective enforcement of the law in certain economically
disenfranchised communities undermines the simple association of
liability and misconduct because it raises fairness concerns in terms of
how the state administers justice.
Deficiencies in indigent defense further call into question the
legitimacy of the misconduct frame.197 Take, for example, the severe
funding deficits in Louisiana that have led to the current crisis in
indigent representation. It has been reported that indigent defendants
have to "get in line" if they hope to have representation.198 This has
meant that many indigent defendants end up being convicted without
representation, sometimes offering a guilty plea in exchange for a fine
in order to avoid jail time. In these cases, the procedural deficiency
means that a conviction is indicative of underfunding and poverty
rather than culpability.199 Indeed, without a "robust system of public
defenders,"200 it is deeply problematic to label these individuals as
morally suspect by virtue of the conviction alone.201 Instead, the
195. Id. at 98.
196. Id.
197. See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1049, 1057-66
(2013) (describing the ways in which the Supreme Court "has made [defense] counsel the sine
qua non of legitimacy"). But see id. at 1066-73 (arguing that particularly in the context of low-
level crimes, the presence of defense counsel is less significant where structural problems such as
underfunding and large caseloads "have hollowed out the ability of individual defense counsel to
make the system work fairly").
198. Debbie Elliot, Need a Public Defender in New Orleans? Get in Line, NPR (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/04/465452920/in-new-orleans-court-appointed-lawyers-turning-away
-suspects [https://perma.cc/JFU2-H3QGI; see also, e.g., Carimah Townes, Louisiana's Budget
Crisis Spells Doomsday for Justice in New Orleans, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2016/03/09/3757685/new-orleans-public-defense-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/XFW5-ZQWC].
199. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 84-86 (noting that most criminal defendants are
indigent and describing how the lack of "meaningful legal representation" can result in guilty
pleas when the defendant has not committed the charged crime).
200. Elliot, supra note 198.
201. See Birckhead, supra note 9, at 1638:
[M]any people with [legal financial obligations] find themselves entrapped in the
criminal justice system because they lack the tools-such as a lawyer, transportation,
or employment-necessary to successfully navigate it. When these individuals are
convicted of a crime. . . it could be argued that they have not, in fact, been "duly
convicted," as "duly" is defined as "correctly, fairly, legitimately, as required, or
rightfully." They have also not been "duly" sentenced when such punishment includes
financial obligations that these individuals have no viable means to meet.
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conviction may reveal failures in the system and other social
pathologies that tend to plague the disenfranchised rather than
confirmation of misconduct. As Professor Alexandra Natapoff has
observed in the context of deficiencies in misdemeanor adjudication:
Convictions are supposed to be reliable badges of personal guilt, and where offenses are
serious and well litigated, convictions are indeed strong indicia of individual culpability.
But as law and evidence lose their influence over outcomes, petty convictions lose that
substantive content. At the bottom, where defendants are poorest and offenses pettiest,
the criminal process is badly detached from the core legitimating precept of individual
fault. This is in part an innocence problem: many misdemeanants are simply not guilty.
But it is also a structural erosion, revealing a system that has become desensitized to
individual culpability and therefore tolerates the imposition of criminal convictions for
reasons other than actual guilt.202
Thus, although it may be reasonable to base bankruptcy policy
on the normative principle that it should not "be a haven for
wrongdoers"203 (as the case of the drunk driver may exemplify), there
is a spectrum of wrongdoing and misconduct in the law. A person
chronically without resources who is cited for staying in his
condemned home arguably exists at the opposite end of this spectrum
than a person who drives drunk and seriously injures someone. If one
accepts this as true, it makes the task of assigning the dishonest label
to any individual who gets caught in the justice system a complicated
and complex endeavor that the current analytical framing of penal
debt in bankruptcy misses. So, while an individual who engages in
willful, destructive behavior, like drunk driving, perhaps should get no
relief from debt stemming from this misconduct, it is harder to
conclude that all individuals who break the law and incur debt as a
result must be made to pay that debt without relief. Yet, current
bankruptcy law does not make that distinction.
Moreover, in cases where government financial motive that
improperly burdens one group more than others drives a justice
system, the misconduct frame is turned on its head, and we might
worry more about the perverse incentives and misconduct of the
creditor state and less about the purported misconduct of the
debtor.204 To that end, where state or municipal policing and
adjudicative processes reveal a profit motive, it may very well be the
actions of the state or municipality and its agents that should raise
concerns about misconduct, which counsels in favor of dischargeability
(footnotes omitted).
202. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1319 (2012).
203. U.S. Dep't. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64
F.3d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1995).
204. See Developments in the Law-Policing, supra note 1, at 1733 (noting that "policing can
be a source of revenue rather than a broad socialized public good").
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of debts that stem from these practices. Yet, bankruptcy policy's
nominal focus on debtor misconduct categorically protects these state
and municipal practices and prevents some subset of potentially
deserving debtors from access to a back-end remedy of bankruptcy.205
The federalism frame has similar analytical limitations in this
context as exemplified by Professor Margaret Howard's critique of the
Court's federalism-based reasoning in Kelly.2 0 6 She argues that the
Kelly Court's deference to federalism principles is unwarranted in the
bankruptcy context both as a matter of the Anti-Injunction Act and as
a matter of Younger and its progeny, which have since extended the
prohibition on federal injunctions to civil proceedings as well.2 0 7 As to
the Anti-Injunction Act, Howard observes that bankruptcy is an
express exception to that statute's proscription on federal injunctions
of state proceedings.208 With respect to the application of Younger
abstention in the bankruptcy context, she argues that abstention in
"collection matters" is inappropriate given Congress's clear intent that
bankruptcy law (and bankruptcy courts) engage with "an entire
category of cases in which extraordinary circumstances exist to justify
federal court intervention"; namely, where debts and debt collection,
even stemming from violations of the law, are at issue.209 She further
argues that the civil rights context of Younger was integral to its
holding and does not translate well in the bankruptcy context where
jurisdiction on discharge is vested exclusively in federal courts.
Specifically, the Court in Younger found it compelling that the
defendant could have raised his federal constitutional claims in the
state forum as a defense to the criminal charges. Howard argues that
a debtor would have no similar occasion to raise bankruptcy discharge
rights in a state forum.210 Thus, "Younger's policy justifications are ...
inapt" and without the "same resonance" in the bankruptcy context.211
Moreover, the Kelly Court need not have worried about "impugning
the competence of state courts" where the Constitution authorizes
Congress to enable federal bankruptcy courts to intervene in state
205. See Moringiello, supra note 154, at 1633-34 (discussing ways to address creditor
misconduct in bankruptcy).
206. See Howard, supra note 13, at 52-54.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 3-5.
209. Id. at 17 (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244,
252 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
210. Id. at 18-19 ("A state criminal proceeding being used primarily as a collection
device ... will not afford the debtor-defendant an equivalent opportunity to raise and present
questions about the scope of his or her bankruptcy discharge.").
211. Id. at 18.
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proceedings.2 12 This is particularly true, she argues, where the "state
proceeding has a collection purpose."213
Yet, Howard's critique does not fully address the limited
application of the federalism frame because she only addresses how
the Court has interpreted Section 523(a)(7) and does not question the
provision itself. Even if the Court had parsed the statute and reached
the conclusion that Howard argues the text requires, there is still the
fact that the bare text of Section 523(a)(7) carves out a set of penal
debts that are nondischargeable. In that regard, Congress too has
implicitly relied on federalism principles by adopting wholesale into
the Bankruptcy Code the judicially created exception to discharge.2 1 4
As discussed above, this approach is rooted in the common law
understanding of how debts owed to the sovereign were traditionally
treated in a bankruptcy proceeding. The approach to federalism
concerns and penal debts, however, is formalistic, and it is
inconsistent with bankruptcy law policy which, at its heart, has an
interest in a functional outcome-namely, the fresh start.
In that regard, Professor Melissa Jacoby's close study and
account of the Detroit bankruptcy process provides an example of how
the bankruptcy court's reliance on function over form helped the
successful reorganization of overwhelming debts. Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code governs municipal bankruptcies, and it prohibits the
bankruptcy court from interfering with traditional municipal political
powers without consent.215 Jacoby's study, however, shows how
integral the bankruptcy judge's interventions were to the city's
reorganization, notwithstanding the nominal federalism-based
restrictions on the bankruptcy judge's power in the municipal
bankruptcy context.216  The bankruptcy court's "active case
management, dealmaking and settlement promotion, team building,
and [its] 'court of the people'" approach helped Detroit to find its way,
in a relatively short period of time, through a proceeding in which the
complex and often competing interests at play threatened to doom a
212. Id. at 19-20 ("Federal courts ... cannot be seen as insulting the state courts when
Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional power, has constructed a system under which
particular issues are given over to the protection of those federal courts. If this is an affront,
Congress and the Constitution must share the blame.").
213. Id. at 20. Howard makes several other critiques, including the Kelly Court's refusal to
parse the language of Section 523(a)(7). Id. at 39.
214. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977).
215. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012); Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the
Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 63 (2016).
216. Jacoby, supra note 215, at 72-100.
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successful reorganization.2 1 7 In that instance, the federal intervention
was arguably necessary to handle the extreme crisis that Detroit
faced.
Moreover, in other bankruptcy contexts, like in the case of
state income taxes, federalism does not limit dischargeability of debts
that implicate important state interests and prerogatives. From this
perspective, it is less clear that state and local penal and collection
objectives should be singled out for protection as a matter of
federalism as compared to state tax policy, which is subordinated in
favor of bankruptcy's fresh start policy.
As a matter of constitutional authority, Congress's
prioritization of federalism concerns in its treatment of penal debt is
plenary. Unlike in Commerce Clause cases,218 Congress's authority to
make a variety of state law debts dischargeable seems fairly clear
because the Supremacy and Bankruptcy clauses give Congress broad
authority to override state laws in bankruptcy.219 As in the case of
state income taxes, Congress does this in many places in the
Bankruptcy Code.220 When it comes to discharging penal debt
however, Congress is reluctant to authorize federal intervention, as
evidenced by its wholesale adoption of judge-made law into the
Bankruptcy Code. But while courts might rightly or wrongly feel
themselves constrained by abstention limits grounded in federalism,
those limits are jurisdictional and not substantive. So it is curious that
Congress would feel itself similarly constrained on federalism grounds
as a matter of substantive bankruptcy law in light of its relatively
217. Id. at 59, 70 (noting that Detroit's "financial troubles were decades in the making [and]
intertwined with social and political challenges" and that "[a]lthough the bankruptcy looked
intractable at the time of filing, Detroit tackled a lot in the next eighteen months").
218. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding legislation invalid
because Congress had exceeded its authority to act under the Commerce Clause); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same).
219. See Casey & Huq, supra note 81, at 1160, 1197 (noting "the peculiar textual position of
bankruptcy as the sole enumerated congressional authority to influence state-created property
and contract interests" and separately that "Congress plainly has the power to alter state law
rights when doing so serves a constitutional purpose"); Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1176
(2016):
Though the parameters of congressional authority to regulate state policies through
the Commerce Clause remain murky, the more specific nature of the Bankruptcy
Clause has systematically been held to grant Congress substantial authority over the
scope of bankruptcy proceedings, even where the results of those proceedings affect
states or their subdivisions.
(footnotes omitted).
220. Casey & Huq, supra note 81, at 1192 (noting that the "central restructuring functions
of bankruptcy" almost always involve private rights authorized and efined under state law).
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clear constitutional mandate to impose on state law through its
bankruptcy power.
Moreover, federalism concerns have not served as an absolute
barrier to federal intervention in state and local processes where civil
rights are at issue. While the Court has receded from this position in
recent years (for example, in the voting rights context), the Court has
still acknowledged that there might be instances in which federal
intervention is appropriate, federalism concerns notwithstanding.2 2 1
Here, policing for profit and other deficiencies in federal, state, and
municipal justice systems have disproportionately impacted
economically and socially disenfranchised communities and people of
color, evoking some of the concerns in the bankruptcy context that
have supported federal intervention in the civil rights context.
Finally, federal penal debt is also at issue given the
proliferation of federal crimes and attendant mandatory fines in the
last thirty years.222 Scholars and commentators have documented this
phenomenon and its effect on disenfranchised communities.223
Federalism would be no barrier to a bankruptcy rule permitting their
discharge. Congress would be imposing on its own penological
prerogatives, rather than imposing on that of the states.
In sum, current problems in federal, state, and local justice
systems, particularly the degree to which those problems are borne
disproportionately by the most vulnerable communities, diminish the
analytical capability of the misconduct/public policy frame as
supplemented by the federalism frame. They do not account for
changes in municipal funding schemes and other intractable problems
in the administration of federal, state, and local justice systems that
have regressive effects and a disparate impact on economically
disenfranchised or otherwise vulnerable communities. If these frames
do not meaningfully explain what is dischargeable and what is not,
what is left is an arbitrary limitation that frustrates the normative
concerns that underpin bankruptcy. Moreover, it does so at the
expense of a community for whom penal debt is particularly
destructive and consequently for whom debt relief is critical.
221. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
222. See, e.g., Ryan v. United States (In re Ryan), 389 B.R. 710 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008)
(considering the discharge ability of penal debt imposed under federal law).
223. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 154-57; Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As




C. The Consequences ofPenal Debt Nondischargeability
That penal debt is largely nondischargeable in bankruptcy is
significant in light of the rise of municipal funding through economic
sanctions and its catastrophic effects in economically disenfranchised
communities. Those crushed under the weight of penal debt will get no
fresh start. Using Ferguson, Missouri, as a primary example, this
Section describes the high stakes of penal debt in economically
disenfranchised communities in order to show the incoherence of the
existing nondischargeability frame.
In the wake of budget shortfalls that have persisted at both
state and local levels at least since the onset of the Great Recession,
many states and their municipalities have had to grapple with the
question of how to fund the services they are tasked with providing to
their constituents.2 2 4 These general fiscal problems have overlapped
with the rise of mass incarceration and increased policing over the last
thirty years, which has strained at the seams the budgets of many
state and local justice systems.22 5 As a result, the states and their
municipalities have come to rely increasingly on revenue from
economic sanctions disproportionately imposed on economically
vulnerable constituents to fund their justice systems and to some
extent their general functions.22 6
These policies have resulted in a perverse set of incentives for
state and municipal agents. Instead of deploying government officials
and civil servants, like police officers and judges, to exercise their
authority and power for the benefit of the public's well-being, profit-
motivated criminal and civil justice policies "effectively turn[ ] courts,
clerks, and probation officers into general tax collectors."22 7 This in
224. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1130-
51 (2014); see also Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 352 (2010) (briefly describing budget crises in various
municipalities); Samir D. Parikh, A New Fulcrum Point for City Survival, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 221, 226-28, 230 (2015) (noting that the Great Recession revealed the "true extent of
municipal [fiscal] destabilization").
225. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Improving Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. L.
REV. 1837, 1842-45 (2015) (describing the rise of mass incarceration since the early 1970s, which
in turn "created untenable [financial] pressures on the criminal justice system").
226. See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 4-5 (describing how in the early 1990s, many states began
codifying their financial penalties); Bannon, Nagrecha & Diller, supra note 7, at 7 (describing
how Florida relies significantly on revenue from fees to fund many aspects of its criminal justice
system as well as its general fund). For example, a recent study of the justice systems of fifteen
states observed how eleven of those states have come to depend on economic sanctions that are
imposed ostensibly to achieve traditional criminal justice goals but in reality "support general
revenue funds, treasuries, or funds unrelated to the administration of criminal law." Id. at 30.
227. Bannon, Nagrecha & Diller, supra note 7, at 30.
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turn causes government officials and civil servants "to act as collection
agents, rather than impartial adjudicators or supervision officers
concerned with public safety and rehabilitation."2 28
The problems engendered by this profit-motivated policing,
along with other defects in the administration of state and municipal
justice systems, are perhaps most clearly exemplified in Ferguson,
Missouri, where the killing of teenager Michael Brown by Ferguson
police officer Darren Wilson in August of 2014 abruptly cast these
issues into the national spotlight.229 Although states and
municipalities, particularly those in the South, had been using fines
and fees to monetize the misfortunes and relative lack of power of poor
blacks for over one hundred years,230 Michael Brown's fate brought to
the fore the degree to which economically and socially disenfranchised
communities continue to be preyed upon for financial gain by state
and local institutions ostensibly tasked with promoting the public
safety and welfare. These practices have resulted in overwhelming
penal debt among those least able to pay it.231
228. Id.; see also Developments in the Law-Policing, supra note 1, at 1734:
Coupling discretionary police power with an ability to raise revenue amplifies the
pathologies that are perverting modern criminal justice. By enacting both more and
broader criminal laws, legislatures have delegated immense power to police and
prosecutors to choose which crimes to investigate, prosecute, and punish. When this
discretion encompasses an ability to extract revenue, even more legislative power is
delegated since these agencies can both avoid and override normal budgeting politics.
(footnote omitted); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1059 (2015) (arguing that the reduction of penalties for minor offenses, such as the imposition of
fines and fees as a punishment for a minor violation of the law, "functions as a kind of regressive
tax, creating perverse incentives for low-level courts that increasingly rely on fines and fees to
fund their own operations").
229. See, e.g., Terrence McCoy, Ferguson Shows How a Police Force Can Turn into a
Plundering 'Collection Agency,' WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/05/ferguson-shows-how-a-police-force-can-turn-into-a-plundering-
collection-agency/ [https://perma.cc/NQ5Z-RYH3].
230. See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT
OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 64-69 (2008) (describing the rise of
the "misdemeanor convict leasing system" in the Reconstruction-era South and noting that "it
significantly funded the operations of government by converting black forced labor into funds for
the counties and states").
231. See, e.g., Gwynn Guilford, These Seven Charts Explain How Ferguson-and Many
Other US Cities-Wring Revenue From Black People and the Poor, QUARTZ (Aug. 28, 2014),
http://qz.com/257042/these-seven-charts-explain-how-ferguson-and-many-other-us-cities-wring-
revenue-from-black-people-and-the-poor/ [https://perma.cc/WJY2-6WV4]:
In its violent crackdowns on demonstrations since a white police officer shot 18-year-
old Michael Brown in early August, Ferguson police revealed a fresh proclivity for
abusing its citizens. However, the city's finances suggest the St. Louis suburb's
criminal justice system has been stealthily exploiting residents-particularly those
who are black or poor-for years.
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The U. S. Department of Justice's investigation into the
practices of the Ferguson Police Department to determine whether the
City of Ferguson and Darren Wilson had violated Michael Brown's
constitutional rights revealed how "Ferguson's law enforcement
practices are shaped by the City's focus on revenue rather than by
public safety needs."2 3 2 The City budgeted for increased revenue year
over year from fines and fees associated with violations of the
Ferguson Municipal Code. Accordingly, the report of the Department
of Justice's findings ("the Report") concluded that the City
"consistently set maximizing revenue as the priority" for the Ferguson
Police Department.233 The Report alleges that the Ferguson Police
Department deployed its officers into the significantly poor
communities with a City-endorsed mandate to maximize revenue from
municipal fines and fees. As a result, "many officers [saw Ferguson]
residents, especially those who live in Ferguson's predominantly
African-American neighborhood, less as constituents to be protected
than as potential offenders and sources of revenue."234
These practices yielded significant profits. In 2013,
approximately $2.6 million in fines and fees collected largely from
traffic and "low-level municipal offenses" represented twenty-one
percent of the City's total budget.235 Moreover, the City's practices
ensured that it alone would benefit financially from violations of the
law. The Ferguson Police Department charged the majority of offenses
for which it stopped individuals as municipal violations, even though
state law cognate violations existed. This practice maximized the
revenue coming directly to the City. 2 3 6 Having set up an atmosphere
in which the residents were likely to violate the law by enacting a
variety of ordinances proscribing a range of fairly innocuous
behaviors, the City set an aggressive schedule of penal fines that were
arguably disproportionate to the infraction. For example, the Report
notes that in 2011, the fine for having too-tall grass was between $77
and $102 as compared to $5 fine set by a surrounding municipality for
a similar infraction.237
Similarly, the City's revenue-focused objective tainted the
Ferguson Municipal Court's adjudication of these infractions. That
232. Ferguson Report, supra note 190, at 2.
233. Id. at 9.
234. Id. at 2.
235. Joseph Shapiro, Civil Rights Attorneys Sue Ferguson over 'Debtors Prisons,' NPR (Feb.
8, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitchl2015/02/08/384332798/civil-rights-attorneys-sue
-ferguson-over-debtors-prisons [https://perma.cclW6VWW-KV65].
236. See Ferguson Report, supra note 190, at 7.
237. Id. at 10.
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court, having jurisdiction over violations of the Ferguson Municipal
Code, resolved the charges brought under the code.2 38 The court was
authorized to impose fines, fees, and imprisonment when it found that
an individual was guilty of violating the Ferguson Municipal Code.2 39
Thus, the court "use[d] its judicial authority as the means to compel
the payment of fines and fees that advance the City's financial
interests."240 The Report observed that although authorized to impose
a jail sentence of up to three months, "the court almost always
impose[d] a monetary penalty payable to the City of Ferguson, plus
court fees."241 Moreover, the court "routinely" issued arrest warrants
when a charged individual failed to appear in court as scheduled or
failed to pay a fine on time.24 2 As a result, individuals charged under
the Ferguson Municipal Code for violations that normally did not
result in a jail sentence, nonetheless ended up facing municipal
warrants, arrest, and jail time in addition to a run-up of costs related
to the non-payment of the initial fine or fee.2 4 3
The Report concluded that Ferguson's "emphasis on revenue
generation" led to an atmosphere in which City leaders and officials
ignored illegal police practices and the effect that these practices had
on the disproportionately poor residents of Ferguson.244 Ultimately,
the Report tells a story of a municipality content to extract as much
financial support and gain as possible from its residents, regardless of
the grave impact these practices have on the well-being of its own
vulnerable citizens. And, when people caught in this revenue-focused
scheme could not pay, they were routinely jailed, even though the
underlying offenses, such as traffic violations, did not mandate a
custodial sentence. 245
And this behavior appears to be widespread. There is powerful
evidence that, like Ferguson, other municipalities have misused
criminal and civil penal fines and fees to line their coffers, shaking
down the poorest and most vulnerable residents in the process. In St.
Louis County alone, municipalities alleged to have engaged in these
types of practices include the towns of Bel Ridge, Florissant, and Pine
238. Id. at 8.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 3.
241. Id. at 8-9.
242. Id. at 9.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2.
245. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 235.
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Lawn.2 4 6 For example, in 2013, the City of Pine Lawn-with an
overwhelmingly African American population of 3,275, whose per
capita income was $13,000 per year-issued 5,333 tickets for various
violations, which brought the total number of outstanding warrants to
23,457.247 This means that in 2013, there were approximately seven
outstanding warrants for each resident of Pine Lawn. Similar
practices have been documented in Arizona,248 California,249
Colorado,25 0  New York,2 5 1  Pennsylvania,2 5 2  Texas,253  and
Washington.254 These practices have left ever-mounting penal debt in
their wake. The consequences of this lingering penal debt are often
devastating to individuals and communities, who are then continually
exposed to arrest, incarceration, and their attendant collateral
consequences.
The experience of sixty-two-year-old Edward Brown is
instructive. The City of Jennings, Missouri, cited him for too-tall grass
in his yard, for trespassing when he remained in his home of twenty-
246. See Thomas Harvey et al., ArchCity Defenders: Municipal Courts White Paper,
ARCHCITY DEFENDERS (2014), http://03a5010.netsolhost.com/WordPress/wp-content/uploads/
2014/11/ArchCity-Defenders-Municipal-Courts-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8YR-5FRC].
247. Id. at 12-13.
248. See ACLU Challenges Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws in Arizona, ACLU (July 22, 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-challenges-civil-asset-forfeiture-laws-arizona [https://perma.cc/
66EY-VLP4].
249. See Above the Law: An Investigation of Civil Asset Forfeiture in California, DRUG POL'Y
ALLIANCE (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.drugpolicy.org/resource/above-law-investigation-civil-
asset-forfeiture-california [https://perma.cc/9WHZ-6RQY].
250. See Limit Cities' Reliance on Revenue from Traffic Fines, DENVER POST (May 15, 2015,
11:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/05/15/limit-cities-reliance-on-revenue-from-traffic-
fines/ [https://perma.cc/F8YV-RS8W].
251. See Patrick McGeehan, Police Slowdown Cost New York City an Estimated $5 Million
in Lost Fines, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/nyregion/police-
slowdown-cost-new-york-city-an-estimated-5-million-in-lost-fines.html?_r=0
[https://perma.ccMJ2T-QEJZ].
252. See Scott Kelly, Broken Justice: An Investigation of Civil Asset Forfeiture in
Montgomery County, ACLU OF PA. (Oct. 2015), https://www.aclupa.org/files/1814/4526/3118/
Broken Justice_-_MontgomeryCounty final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ7A-4FMQ]; Scott Kelly,
Guilty Property: How Law Enforcement Takes $1 Million in Cash from Innocent Philadelphians
Every Year-and Gets Away with It, ACLU OF PA. (June 2015), https://www.aclupa.org/files/3214/
3326/0426/GuiltyProperty-Report_-_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/858K-LXWX]; Scott Kelly,
Forfeiture in the Shadows: An Investigation of Civil Asset Forfeiture in Cumberland County,
ACLU OF PA. (Dec. 2015), https://www.aclupa.org/files/2114/5010/9994/CumberlandCounty
ForfeitureReport-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6473-AQPH].
253. See Nick Sibilla, Texas Town Earns 89 Percent of Its Revenue from Fines and
Forfeitures, INST. FOR JUST. (Aug. 21, 2014), http://ij.org/action-post/texas-town-earns-89-percent-
of-its-revenue-from-fines-and-forfeiture/ [https://perma.cc/NMX3-X7LT].




five years after the City had condemned it, and for failing to have his
dog vaccinated for rabies. Mr. Brown, whose income was limited to
$488 per month in Social Security benefits and food stamps, could not
pay the $464 that he owed the City. He was jailed repeatedly for his
failure to pay the fine, once for thirty days and another time for
twenty days, and he ultimately lost his home.2 5 5 One resident of
Pagedale, Missouri-a city of approximately three thousand
predominantly African American residents, approximately twenty-five
percent of whom live below the poverty line-was fined for "petty
violations" like chipped paint on her home and a loose screen door.25 6
When she could not pay the outstanding penal debts associated with
these violations, she was arrested for "[b]uilding code [v]iolation,
contempt, and default."2 5 7 She ultimately took out a high-cost payday
loan ostensibly to fix the violations and reduce her exposure to further
arrests.258
In addition to the threat of incarceration, there are a host of
devastating collateral consequences that result from lingering penal
debt. For example, individuals who are imprisoned for not paying an
outstanding debt must contend with the specter of job loss; the
inability to meet other financial obligations while incarcerated, such
255. Shapiro, supra note 189. Brown sued the city alleging various constitutional violations.
In July 2016, the City settled the lawsuit, agreeing to pay $4.7 million to approximately two
thousand individuals who had been confined in the City's jails because they could not pay fines
and fees. Campbell Robertson, Missouri City to Pay $4.7 Million to Settle Suit over Jailing




256. Policing for Profit in St. Louis County, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/opinion/sunday/policing-for-profit-in-st-louis-county.html
?smid=tw-share&_r=0 [https://perma.ccIU5RE-N6MJ].
257. Complaint at 71, Whitner v. City of Pagedale, No. 4:15-cv-01655 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4,
2015), 2015 WL 6746482; Pagedale Municipal Fines: Class Action Lawsuit Challenges Policing
for Profit in St. Louis Co. Municipal Court System, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/case/pagedale-
municipal-fines/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc[R37L-F2UP].
258. See Policing for Profit in St. Louis County, supra note 256 (noting that "[t]hese fines are
an enormous hardship for the poor and for elderly homeowners on fixed incomes"). She is now
part of a federal lawsuit on behalf of several residents against the City of Pagedale, Missouri,
alleging that Pagedale officials "violat[ed] due process and excess-fines protections in the
Constitution by turning its code enforcement and municipal court into 'revenue-generating
machines' to go after residents." Monica Davey, Lawsuit Accuses Missouri City of Fining
Homeowners to Raise Revenue, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/
us/lawsuit-accuses-missouri-city-of-fining-homeowners-to-raise-revenue.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cclB8SP-DZ3Y]; see Complaint, Whitner v. City of Pagedale, No. 4:15-cv-01655
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 2015), 2015 WL 6746482.
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as child support;259 the run-up of other debts while the individual is
imprisoned, such as rent or utilities; and the loss of privileges, such as
a driver's license, that are crucial to day-to-day life. 2 6 0
Individuals who cannot pay penal debt also face extended loss
of rights. Professor Ann Cammett has chronicled how "the problem of
mounting criminal justice debt can also serve as an insurmountable
obstacle to the resumption of voting rights and broader participation
in society."261 She describes the rise of state laws that condition re-
enfranchisement of felons on their repayment of outstanding penal
debt.2 6 2 For poor felons (who are the bulk of felons leaving
imprisonment), penal debt is likely to go unpaid for a significant
period time which may leave them indefinitely without the basic right
to vote.2 63
Another significant consequence of outstanding penal debt has
arisen in the wake of the Court's recent ruling in Utah v. Strieff.26 4 In
Strieff, a Utah police officer stopped the defendant without reasonable
suspicion, and, after asking for the defendant's identification,
discovered an outstanding warrant stemming from a "small traffic
warrant."265 The police officer then searched Strieff and found drugs.
Strieff moved to suppress the evidence because the police officer
initially stopped him without reasonable suspicion. The Court held
that the valid arrest warrant that stemmed from a traffic violation
was enough to attenuate the connection between the unconstitutional
stop and the discovery of contraband.266
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor predicted that the Court's
decision would have grievous implications for the Fourth Amendment
rights of any individual with an outstanding warrant.267 In other
words, the practical consequence of Strieff is that any person with a
warrant, such as those routinely issued when penal debt remains
unpaid, may now be subject to search and seizure even where there is
no reasonable suspicion to authorize a constitutional stop.2 6 8 This
leaves individuals, and indeed whole communities (who cannot pay
259. Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of
Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 385-86 (2012).
260. See Bannon, Nagrecha & Diller, supra note 7.
261. Cammett, supra note 259, at 352.
262. Id. at 387-91.
263. Id.
264. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
265. Id. at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting the record).
266. Id. at 2059 (majority opinion).




their penal debts, which in turn triggers the issuance of arrest
warrants attendant to that unpaid debt), without appreciable Fourth
Amendment protections.
Thus, the use of the misconduct, public policy, and federalism
frames in the context of penal debt functions to deprive certain
debtors of a fresh start. This outcome is suggestive of the ways in
which the nondischargeability frames may embody certain tropes that
don't map on to the realities of how debt is incurred in a set of complex
social circumstances. Perhaps these complexities belie a hard and fast
rule that denies a discharge for all debts of a certain essential nature
without any further inquiry into how they came into being.
D. Rethinking Nondischargeability?
The categorical nondischargeability of certain debts in
bankruptcy, including penal debt, has negative implications for
bankruptcy's normative lodestar, the fresh start principle. The limited
analytical value of the frames that animate the treatment of
categorically nondischargeable debt in bankruptcy provides an
opportunity to consider reorienting bankruptcy back to the fresh start.
The penal debt example again provides a lens through which to
consider how nondischargeability unnecessarily frustrates the fresh
start principle.
In the specific context of penal debt, the burden on the fresh
start is particularly compelling. For example, the externalities borne
by the families and the communities of individuals burdened by penal
debt are significant. The children of individuals imprisoned for being
unable to pay off penal debt are left without their primary caretaker
for unpredictable periods of time. This requires friends and family
members to step in to care for these children, imposing additional
costs, particularly in communities where penal debt is widespread.269
These communities already struggle with limited economic resources,
and, in this way, persistent penal debt further entrenches their
economic disenfranchisement.
In addition, unpredictable jail time results in a significant loss
of productivity and its attendant social benefit. Job loss resulting from
incarceration for failure to pay debt was common in St. Louis
County.270 For example, one woman who was jailed for two weeks
after failing to pay traffic-related fines described missing a job
interview and falling behind on her studies to become a paralegal
269. See, e.g., Balko, supra note 8.
270. Id.; see also Harvey et al., supra note 246, at 1-2.
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while she was held in custody.27 1 She reported that her disabled
mother borrowed funds in order to get her daughter out of jail. In the
aggregate, these types of outcomes likely represent a net loss in terms
of productivity.
Finally, there is the issue of socially optimal risk-taking. The
risk of being subjected to police contact that results in the imposition
of a fine or fee was extremely high in Ferguson. At the end of 2014,
seventy-five percent of the town's population (approximately sixteen
thousand people) had outstanding arrest warrants, many for minor
violations of the law.27 2 For some unable to pay the attendant fines,
this meant avoiding leaving their homes for fear of being arrested.
Unmanageable penal debt then transforms mundane yet socially
optimal behavior, like leaving one's house to go to work or to school,
into particularly risky behavior. To the extent that bankruptcy law,
without meaningful justification, does not provide a safety net for
these risks, it perhaps upsets the balance between socially optimal ex
ante risk-taking and ex post relief that the fresh start embodies.
Extrapolating from the penal debt example to consider the
concept of categorical nondischargeability more generally, as it unduly
encroaches on and limits a fresh start, we might conclude that instead
of relying on categorical notions of nondischargeability as policing the
limits of debt relief, we might instead focus on the condition of the
debtor to function as a limit on when a discharge is appropriate.
Indeed, with a recommitment to the fresh start principle that holds
bankruptcy law accountable to its own normative orientation, we
might better address the degree to which the existing
nondischargeability approach engenders a class bias in bankruptcy
access by making bankruptcy an option for debts common across the
socioeconomic spectrum.
E. Rethinking Unintended Consequences?
An important consideration in terms of a move away from
categorical nondischargeability, either in the penal debt context
specifically or as to all categories of nondischargeable debt more
generally, is the degree to which such a change would lead to
unintended consequences or result in undesirable ripple effects. We
might worry that any benefits of increased discharge and a move away
271. Balko, supra note 8.
272. Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, One Year Later: Ferguson Is Still Pumping Out Arrest




from categorical nondischargeability are outweighed by any increased
costs to society resulting from, for example, reduced deterrence in the
penal debt context. This, of course, depends on the degree to which
fines or fees have a beneficial deterrent effect. Alternatively, we might
understand an important benefit of such a change would be a
realignment of municipal policies as related to fines and fees.
We might also worry that governmental actors, such as judges
or prosecutors, who are authorized to exercise discretion in justice
systems, might act differently if the law changed. That is to say, they
might exercise their discretion in a way that is harmful to the very
constituency that, at least in the penal debt context, increased
dischargeability might help. This, of course, depends on the degree to
which these actors might actually adjust in response to such a change.
In the penal debt context, the likelihood of some default (i.e., failure to
pay on time) has not seemed to result in judges imposing custodial
sentences over economic sanctions where that is an option.
Ultimately, then, the likelihood of unintended consequences
depends on how we first identify and then balance the relative costs
and benefits of the fresh start on the one hand and the costs and
benefits of the existing frames on the other. At a minimum, this
Article hopes to spark conversation about how we think about the
latter concern, which is to say how we think about and identify the
costs associated with unrelenting debt, particularly as experienced by
communities that can least bear the burden of permanent liability. In
the end, it might be the case that existing consumer bankruptcy law,
with its apparent class bias, is the best we can do to balance the
tensions inherent between the fresh start and other policy concerns
that animate categorical nondischargeability. Alternatively, we might
begin to understand that current bankruptcy law is actually serving
some alternate purpose other than the fresh start, and that the fresh
start idea is, in fact, a relic of an earlier time in which debt was not
ubiquitous in everyday life. These are all important considerations
that exist beyond the scope of this Article and indeed demand further
and more considered exploration.
IV. BANKRUPTCY AND SOCIAL UTILITY
The view presented above, that bankruptcy may have some
significance in the lives of economically and socially disenfranchised
people who struggle with debt, conceptualizes bankruptcy as having
social utility and practical effects on group inequality. For example, in
the penal debt context, bankruptcy law can serve as a counterbalance
to municipal practices that take advantage of the relative political
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weaknesses of economically and socially disenfranchised people.
Municipalities have little incentive to treat fairly poor people who, as
a group, have little political power to influence change in the system.
If present practice is indicative of how change is likely to come, the
poor must wait until a cellphone captures an act of state violence that
is borne of a merciless system like the profit-motivated administration
of justice that takes advantage of the disenfranchised. Then, unless
the groundswell of external outrage motivates remediation, we are
inclined to ignore or discredit the protestations of the afflicted in favor
of stock responses about the sanctity of the police power.
While complex social problems, like those that engender
crushing penal debt in economically disenfranchised communities,
belie a simple fix from any one perspective, a bankruptcy regime that
contemplates the discharge of penal debt can incentivize a change of
behavior in institutional actors, such as police and municipal judges,
who engage in practices that unduly burden their most vulnerable
constituents with penal debt. This view is consistent with Professors
Clayton Gillette and David Skeel's observations about the social
utility of bankruptcy in the municipal context. Advocating for
bankruptcy as a means of addressing faulty municipal governance,
they remark, "Bankruptcy may . . . create political opportunities that
did not previously exist. Indeed one benefit of permitting structural
reform in bankruptcy may be that the existence of the option makes
its exercise unnecessary since the locality may prefer to restructure on
its own rather than risk external imposition."2 73 In this instance,
bankruptcy as a backstop to unmanageable penal debt might
encourage municipalities not to hinge their financial fortunes on the
backs of their most vulnerable constituents. This suggests broader
questions of the social implications of bankruptcy that to date have
not been afforded much scholarly attention, but which are not entirely
novel. In 1970, Congress authorized the creation of a bankruptcy
commission whose mandate was to study the existing law and suggest
reforms to the system. The resulting report, issued in 1973 after three
years of intensive study of several aspects of the bankruptcy system,
noted that "the bankruptcy process is a funnel through which [to] pour
a wide variety of problems that, however noneconomic in origin, are
manifested in burdensome debts."274 In understanding bankruptcy
through this lens, there are several issues that require some
exploration, like the inherent difficulty of accessing bankruptcy for
273. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 219, at 1195.
274. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
DoC. No. 93-137, at 74 (1973).
2017] 967
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
people who have few if any financial resources. Simply put, some of
the administrative barriers that currently deter bankruptcy filers
would have to fall. This broadening, however, is consistent with the
evolution of bankruptcy as a tool that has become increasingly
oriented toward serving an ever-broader range of socially situated
individuals. It is also consistent with bankruptcy's role in many
socially significant, debt-related issues of national significance, like
the asbestos crisis. This Section addresses each in turn and closes
with some thoughts on why bankruptcy courts might be appropriately
suited to engage with debt problems, even when they arise in complex
social circumstances.
A. On Problems of Access
It is important to acknowledge, however, that a change in the
law might accomplish little if one concludes that bankruptcy is a
fundamentally improper mechanism for debt relief of this kind or that
it has no practical utility. In this respect, there is the question of
whether bankruptcy law is useful given its own apparent limitations
and given the costs associated with filing a petition. Bankruptcy
scholars have expressed substantial concerns about whether current
bankruptcy law does any real work for the middle class, much less for
economically disenfranchised groups. Bankruptcy scholars have also
considered how the filing fee and other costs associated with
bankruptcy limit access to a fresh start for indigent filers. To the
extent that this is true, then a change in the law as to penal debt
might accomplish little to nothing for the most vulnerable debtors.
Professors Katherine Porter and Deborah Thorne studied
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers in the year following their discharge.275
Although sixty-five percent of those surveyed indicated that their
financial situation had improved after receiving a discharge, more
than twenty-five percent of filers indicated that their financial
situation remained the same, and eight percent indicated that their
financial situation was worse, notwithstanding the discharge.276 Thus,
Porter and Thorne concluded that "[t]he most fundamental
assumption of consumer bankruptcy-that the fresh start results in a
productive end-is suspect," and that for many Chapter 7 filers, the
discharge did little to nothing to ameliorate their financial distress.277
275. Katherine Porter & Dr. Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2006).
276. Id. at 87-88.
277. Id. at 88.
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Katherine Porter also studied outcomes for Chapter 13 filers
whose cases were dismissed before discharge. As the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project has revealed that only about one third of Chapter
13 filings result in a discharge, this group of debtors accounts for the
majority of Chapter 13 filers. Porter found that those debtors who filed
under Chapter 13 in an attempt to save their homes from foreclosure
ultimately lost those homes, and those debtors who filed in order to
lower their unsecured consumer debt ended up owing more after
failing to complete the Chapter 13 process.278 Thus, Porter dubbed
Chapter 13 a "pretend solution," that "entrench[es] the status quo and
discourage[s] efforts to argue that laws need to be improved."279
By contrast, Professors Will Dobbie, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham,
and Crystal Yang studied the post-filing outcomes of Chapter 13 filers
who received a discharge as against those unfortunate filers who did
not.2 8 0 While Porter describes the grim picture of financial health that
dismissed Chapter 13 filers face, Dobbie, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and
Yang note several positive outcomes for those individuals who
received a discharge following a Chapter 13 filing, six to eight years
after the discharge. For example, they observed that following the
discharge, the Chapter 13 debtor had $1,333 of unsecured debt in
collections as compared to $4,217 for the filer who did not receive a
discharge.281 In addition, the Chapter 13 filer who owned her home
had a higher probability of keeping the home.2 8 2 Dobbie, Goldsmith-
Pinkham, and Yang also observed that in the five years following a
discharge, the Chapter 13 filer was less likely to seek new credit and
less likely to use revolving credit lines. The discharged Chapter 13
filer also enjoyed a higher credit score.283 Thus, Dobbie, Goldsmith-
Pinkham, and Yang reveal that bankruptcy has some significant value
for those who are fortunate enough to get a discharge.
Professor Mechele Dickerson has also been critical of current
bankruptcy laws and their ability to facilitate financial relief for all
middle class filers. She notes that bankruptcy laws seem to benefit a
specific demographic profile.284 For example, this "Ideal Debtor" has
access to funds to pay for a lawyer, both to engage in the pre-filing
278. Porter, supra note 18, at 144-52.
279. Id. at 114.
280. Will Dobbie, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Crystal Yang, Consumer Bankruptcy and
Financial Health 2 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21032, 2015).
281. Id. at 2-3.
282. Id. at 3.
283. Id.




planning and to prepare the bankruptcy petition, and pay the filing
fee.2 85 The Ideal Debtor is also married and has little or no debts that
are nondischargeable under Sections 523(a)(7) or 1328(a). She also has
assets that are exempt and is the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust or
other wealth-holding product that is not included in the bankruptcy
estate.286 In short, the "Ideal Debtor" is a high-wealth but low-income
individual whose wealth is held in assets or forms that permit the filer
to hold on to it through a bankruptcy proceeding.287 Dickerson argues
that this has resulted in a structural racial bias in the Code since, as a
statistical matter, this Ideal Debtor is likely to be white and unlikely
to be black or Hispanic.288
In the case of the poor individual with penal debt, however,
even if it doesn't mean a better financial life, a discharge might help to
preserve the liberty of the debtor. The poor might be judgment proof
so that commercial creditors have no leverage in collection. And
conventional wisdom is that with no threat of collection comes no need
for relief in the form of a discharge.289 But the poor debtor might gain
prolonged freedom and personal liberty or the advantage of a stay in
collection proceedings while she figures out alternatives to dealing
with penal debt from a discharge.290 In addition, to the extent that
penal debt stays with a debtor for life, it raises familiar concerns
regarding the disincentivization of already-disenfranchised
individuals from working and otherwise participating in their
communities.291
285. Id. at 1743-44.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1744-45.
288. Id. at 1726-27.
289. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J.
289, 290-91 (2010).
290. Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the
Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2052-53 (1999) ("In
addition, some judgment proof debtors who file for bankruptcy pro se would not have done so had
they received proper advice."); Daniel L. Skoler, The Status and Protection of Social Security
Benefits in Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 585, 591 (1993):
Regardless of the foregoing, it remains a fact that an elderly or disabled debtor who
has minimum assets and virtually all of whose income is derived from Social Security
retirement, survivors, or disability insurance (RSDI) payments, or SSI payments, is
"judgment proof" and may not cost-effectively be placed in bankruptcy.
This notion might raise concerns about bankruptcy as obstruction, where it is only the stay that
the debtor is looking for.
291. See, e.g., Colgan, supra note 9, at 291-92 (describing "[t]he cycle of economic sanctions,
interest, collections, and incarceration" as "financially devastating," in part because "[i]n many
jurisdictions, criminal histories remain active or cannot be sealed so long as criminal debts are
outstanding, which can impede the ability to find employment"); Jackson, supra note 10.
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More fundamentally, even if penal debt was dischargeable in
bankruptcy, the costs associated with filing bankruptcy present a
threshold barrier to a discharge. A debtor who wants to file a
bankruptcy petition must pay a filing fee of $335 for a Chapter 7 case
and a filing fee of $310 for a Chapter 13 case.2 9 2 The average cost of a
bankruptcy attorney in a Chapter 7 case ranges from approximately
$900 to $1,100 depending on jurisdiction and whether the case is an
asset or no-asset case.29 3 In other words, it costs money to get a
discharge, and some people "can be too poor to go bankrupt."294
Professors Ronald Mann and Katherine Porter have described
the degree to which the filing fee and other costs associated with a
bankruptcy filing-such as attorney fees-function as a barrier to
optimal bankruptcy filings for low-income, low-asset debtors. Mann
and Porter noted how few debtors who might benefit from a
bankruptcy discharge actually file in any given year, and sought to
discover why this is so.2 9 5 Relying on data from the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project, Mann and Porter observed that the most
significant determinant of whether a debtor would file for bankruptcy
was her ability to save enough money for the filing fee and for an
attorney.296 Thus Mann and Porter conclude that "excessive costs
deter socially valuable bankruptcies," and propose "a simplified
administrative process that provides prompt relief [to low-income and
low-asset filers] without the costs and delay of judicial process."297
Since 2005, Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers have been eligible to
file a petition in forma pauperis, in which the filing fee is waived.2 98 In
order to qualify, the filer must have an income that is below 150% of
the federal poverty level.299 Using data from the Consumer
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) (2012); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 435 (1973) ("The
Bankruptcy Act and one of this Court's complementary Orders in Bankruptcy impose fees and
make the payment of those fees a condition to a discharge in voluntary bankruptcy.");
Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 1, 2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/bankruptcy-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule
[https://perma.cclRTS7-KNRK]; Filing Fees: Abbreviated Fee Schedule, U.S. BANKR. CT. CENT.
DIST. CAL. (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/filing-fees [https://perma.cc/7G6Q-N66R].
293. See Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 17, 68 (2012).
294. Karen Gross, In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy: Reflecting on and Beyond United
States v. Kras, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 57, 57 (1994).
295. Mann & Porter, supra note 289, at 290 (citing Michelle White's study that showed that
of "a group of households in which bankruptcy relief would have afforded an economic benefit to
about 15% of them, but only about 0.66-1% sought relief any given year").
296. Id. at 292.
297. Id. at 293.




Bankruptcy Project, Philip Tedesco observed that few eligible filers
petitioned the court to proceed in forma pauperis.300 Although 43% of
filers in the sample qualified for the fee waiver, just 5.8% applied.
Moreover, debtors who were represented by an attorney were less
likely to apply than debtors who filed pro se.30 1 Tedesco further
observed that most applications were granted, concluding then that in
forma pauperis waivers are drastically underused in bankruptcy.
Tedesco thus proposes a system in which filers that qualify may
presumptively proceed in forma pauperis instead of the current
system that requires these filers to petition the court.
Even if the filing fee could be waived, there is still the
challenge of affording a lawyer to assist the indigent debtor in
navigating the complex consumer bankruptcy system. The attorney's
fee represents the most significant cost of a bankruptcy filing, 30 2 and
having a lawyer in bankruptcy brings many benefits to filers, perhaps
most significantly a decreased likelihood that the case will be
dismissed. Professor Angela Littwin has observed that after the 2005
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
amendments, which significantly increased the administrative
requirements of a bankruptcy filing, 17.6% of pro se Chapter 7 filers
had their cases dismissed or converted to the more onerous Chapter
13, as compared to just 1.9% of represented filers. 303
Yet, even pro se bankruptcy filers succeed in realizing benefits
from the bankruptcy system. Professor Jason luliano conducted a
study of filers who commenced an adversarial proceeding to have their
student loan debt declared dischargeable.3 0 4 He noted that most
eligible debtors did not seek to have their student loans discharged,
but of those who did and were successful, many filed pro se.3 05
Notwithstanding these successes, I acknowledge that the cost burdens
associated with filing might make bankruptcy prohibitive for the
indigent individual who wants to discharge penal debt. On the other
hand, if bankruptcy is an option, it might encourage attorneys who
provide pro bono services to indigent clients in other contexts to fold
bankruptcy into the set of substantive services provided.
300. Id. at 80.
301. Id.
302. Lois R. Lupica, The Costs of BAPCPA- Report of the Pilot Study of Consumer
Bankruptcy Cases, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 43, 48 (2010).
303. Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy's Greatest
Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1971-72 (2011).
304. Jason luliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue
Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 499 (2012).
305. Id. at 499, 507, 522.
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B. On Following the Trajectory of Bankruptcy Utility
Critics of the current bankruptcy regime make a good point
about its own internal and structural barriers to discharge. And these
barriers would have to fall in order to improve the financially
restorative value of bankruptcy to economically disenfranchised
debtors. Yet, a movement in this direction is consistent with the
evolution of our conception of American bankruptcy law's social
utility. Beginning with an early creditor-focused posture, it has
progressed to its current debtor-tolerant posture, which itself has
evolved from a focus on the financial woes of the wealthy merchant
class to the middle class. A move toward addressing the needs of the
lower class is in line with this trajectory.
For example, the 1800 Act followed in the wake of the Panics of
1792 and 1797, which "caused widespread ruin and the imprisonment
of thousands of debtors,"306 many of whom were wealthy financiers
and speculators who ran into financial troubles after risky, profit-
seeking behavior.307 Because imprisonment for debt was still a
legitimate practice, many important men found themselves in jail
because they could not pay their debts.308 A bankruptcy law was a way
to bring relief to those who had lost their liberty as a result.30 9
Bankruptcy became a palatable, if highly contested, solution once the
too-important-to-fail quality of a significant number of debtors became
clear.310 For example, Robert Morris, a founding father who helped to
finance the Revolutionary War, found himself in debt in the late 1790s
and was imprisoned for over three years in a Pennsylvania debtor's
prison.311 The 1800 Act was passed, in part, to give him relief.3 12
306. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14 (1995), The 1841 Act followed the Panic of 1837 and the 1867 Act
followed the devastation wrought by the Civil War.
307. Id. at 14-15; see also BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS 102 (2002) ("The
imprisonment of 'wealthy debtors'-and the deaths of some of them-confounded the normal
expectations of social and economic status and altered the political dimensions of debtors'
relief.").
308. MANN, supra note 307, at 99 (noting that "[t]he collapse of large scale speculation
schemes in the 1790s resulted for the first time in the imprisonment of large numbers of what
one might call 'wealthy debtors'").
309. See Tabb, supra note 306, at 14-15.
310. MANN, supra note 307, at 102 ("The imprisonment of 'wealthy debtors'-and the deaths
of some of them-confounded the normal expectations of social and economic status and altered
the political dimensions of debtors' relief."). But see Casey & Huq, supra note 81, at 1166 n.50
(noting that one of the reasons the 1800 Act was repealed just three years after its passage "was
precisely that it benefited wealthy individual merchants such as Robert Morris").




The 1841, 1867, and 1898 Acts all ushered in increased debtor-
centered innovations like the authorization of voluntary filing,
expanded exemptions, and the discharge without creditor consent.313
These changes moved bankruptcy toward the ordinary non-merchant
individual in financial distress. Fast-forwarding to the modern times,
bankruptcy law has come to occupy an important position in the social
safety net for the middle class.3 1 4 It offers relief for unmanageable
debt that is often associated with the middle class, like medical debt,
which itself invokes underlying complexities of social significance.
Over the last twenty-five years, the Consumer Bankruptcy
Project, a longitudinal study of consumer bankruptcy filings, has
shown that most consumer bankruptcy filers are middle class.315 From
this data, the founding principal investigators of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project wove a very powerful story about the importance
of consumer bankruptcy to the financial health of the middle class
and, as a consequence, to the health of the nation.316 The justification
for a robust consumer bankruptcy system is very much tethered to
their observations. On the standard account, people who file for
bankruptcy are normal members of the middle class who make up the
"economic engine of [America]" 317 and are the "backbone of the
Republic."318 Many of them, however, have run into serious financial
hardship as a result of unavoidable and unexpected exogenous shock,
such as a serious illness, income interruption, and marriage
dissolution.319 They are not simply profligate spenders looking for a
convenient means to scrape away the residue of their debts.320
Instead, in the midst of a confluence of awful circumstances, they have
313. See Peter C. Alexander, With Apologies to C.S. Lewis: An Essay on Discharge and
Forgiveness, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 601, 604-08 (2000).
314. See, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer
Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 138-39 (2005) (distinguishing between social
insurance and social assistance programs, and suggesting that bankruptcy is a form of social
insurance).
315. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 15, at 2.
316. Id.; see also, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior:
An Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 535, 536
(2006); Nathalie Martin, Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences, 11AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 367, 387-88 (2003); Elizabeth Warren, The Growing Threat to Middle Class
Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 401-03 (2004).
317. See Macon Phillips, A Strong Middle Class Equals a Strong America, WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Jan. 30, 2009, 10:02 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/01/30/a-strong-
middle-class-equals-a-strong-america [https://perma.cc/HP83-43CE] ("Our road to economic
recovery begins with restoring the prosperity of working families and small business owners.").
318. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 15, at 1.
319. Id. at 2.
320. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the Means?,
75 AM. BANKR. L. J. 243, 262-63 (2001).
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turned to bankruptcy as a one-time solution through which they can
find renewed financial life. Through this lens, consumer bankruptcy
law can be viewed as an important tool: 32 1 it acts as a one-time safety
valve to provide relief to the middle class-on whose financial health
the country relies-in times of serious financial trouble.322
In presenting data from their seminal study of consumer
bankruptcies, Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook observed
that "bankruptcy is a middle class phenomenon."323 They noted that
even though most of the filers had very low incomes at the time of
filing, 324 they largely represented a cross section of the American
middle class as based on indicators such as educational attainment,
occupational status, and homeownership.32 5 The authors noted that
this picture of the typical bankruptcy filer was vastly different from
the then-existing stereotype of a bankruptcy filer "as existing far
below the middle class," a stereotype that ostensibly worked against a
favorable view of bankruptcy's social utility.326 Moreover, these middle
class bankruptcy filers had fallen into financial problems after some
exogenous shock to their lives, like a divorce or an illness.327
For example, unmanageable medical debt exemplifies debt that
has an increasing significance on the financial well-being of the
middle class. Some scholars and commentators have viewed
bankruptcy as a means-if an imperfect one-of addressing the
321. See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 314, at 138-39.
322. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Participation and Hope, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1761, 1774 n.47
(1998) ("If ... it takes a stable middle class, along with stable working-class jobs, to provide a
sound foundation for democracy, then might it not be expected that a sharp decline in the
fortunes of people in those middle-to-lower economic brackets would tend to destabilize the
polity?"); see also Joe Biden, Time to Put Middle Class Front and Center, USATODAY (Jan. 30,
2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20090130/column30_st3.art.htm
[https://perma.cclW6SB-ENU9] ("A strong middle class equals a strong America. We can't have
one without the other.").
323. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 15, at 27.
324. Id. at 63.
325. Id. at 27-74; see also Elizabeth Warren & Deborah Thorne, A Vulnerable Middle Class:
Bankruptcy and Class Status, in BROKE: How DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 25, 25
(Katherine Porter ed., 2012). Warren and Thorne observed this same pattern of middle class
filers in the 2007 iteration of the study. For example, bankruptcy filers in 2007 were more
educated than filers in 1991 and were more educated than people in the general population. Id.
at 30; see also Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start
or Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1071-73 (2004) (suggesting that because of "income
volatility," income alone is not a relevant marker of middle class status among bankruptcy filers
and that while other social safety net programs are designed for the lower classes, bankruptcy
appears to provide a safety net for middle class individuals who may not qualify for other social
safety net programs).




problem.328 Professors Melissa Jacoby, Teresa Sullivan, and Elizabeth
Warren studied the connection between bankruptcy filings and
medical debt in Phase III of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project,
conducted in 1999.329 The authors described previous studies of
bankruptcy filings, observing that prior to the 1990s, medical debt did
not appear to be a significant driver of bankruptcy filings.330 By 1999,
the authors reported that medical debt was pervasive in bankruptcy
filings, even if not the apparent driver of the decision to file.331 For
example, 46.2% of bankruptcy filers in the sample indicated that they
filed bankruptcy for a medical reason or that they had at least $1,000
in medical bills. 332 In addition, consistent with the middle class story
about bankruptcy filers, the authors observed that "there was no clear
association between identifying a medical problems and being
uninsured."333
For Jacoby, Sullivan, and Warren, the data suggested that
neither private healthcare insurance nor Medicare was sufficient to
protect a significant portion of the middle class against a health crisis
or catastrophic injury.334 This conclusion was confirmed by data from
the 2007 iteration of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, which
revealed that medical debt had become an even more significant
problem for the middle class, as suggested by bankruptcy filings. By
2007, 69.1% of filers cited medical debt as contributing to their
financial troubles as compared to the 46.2% previously recorded.335
328. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the
Debates Over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
375, 375 (2001).
329. Id. at 376-77.
330. Id. at 378.
331. Id. at 387-88.
332. Id. at 389.
333. Id. at 399-401 (noting also that "nearly eighty percent of the bankrupt families had at
least some health insurance coverage at the time of their bankruptcy filings ... suggest[ing] that
higher rates of insurance were coupled with higher rates of medically related financial
problems").
334. Id. at 405 (hypothesizing that the incidence of uncovered family members, inadequate
coverage of medical costs, and "employment difficulties" might explain why medical insurance
did not provide better insulation against extreme financial hardship caused by health problems).
335. David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Steffie Woolhandler,
Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741,
744 (2009), http://www.amjmed.com/article/SO002-9343(09)00404-5/pdf [https://perma.cc/6RQE-
CYC8]; see also Christopher Tarver Robertson, Richard Egelhof & Michael Hoke, Get Sick, Get
Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 76-77 (2008)
(noting that between 1981, the first year of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, and 2007, medical
bankruptcies had "grown twenty-fold"). But see Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing
Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 239, 258-62
(2010) (describing resistance to the validity of these findings).
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And, as was the case in 1999, "the mere fact of insurance" alone was
not "synonymous with protection from financial risk arising from
medical problems."336 Indeed, a 2013 study by a private personal
finance group similarly found that financial distress from healthcare
bills had become the primary cause of bankruptcy filings, as based on
data from the U.S. Census, the Centers for Disease Control,
bankruptcy filings, and a private healthcare foundation.337
In this state of the world, the bankruptcy system has been
described as an important component of the middle class social safety
net because it acts as "the insurer of last resort to [middle class]
families and individuals who cannot pay health-care-related costs"
and gives them "the opportunity to put the brakes on their slide out of
the middle class."338 For example, President Obama's economic agenda
included the intention to: "[C]reate an exemption in bankruptcy law
for individuals who can prove they filed for bankruptcy because of
medical expenses. This exemption will create a process that forgives
the debt and lets the individuals get back on their feet."3 3 9 And,
bankruptcy law is attentive to this pervasive, largely middle class
problem 340 because medical debt is generally dischargeable in
bankruptcy.341
As in the case of medical debt, the conception of bankruptcy's
social utility has evolved to encompass the notion that bankruptcy law
plays a significant role in helping individuals and entities to manage
debt related to complex social issues. In that respect, viewing
bankruptcy as a means of addressing the pathologies of penal debt,
particularly as they ravage poor and economically and socially
disenfranchised communities, is not as controversial as it might seem
in the abstract and in line with its current evolution. Even though in
336. Melissa B. Jacoby, Individual Health Insurance Mandates and Financial Distress: A
Few Notes from the Debtor-Creditor Research and Debates, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (2007).
337. See Dan Mangan, Medical Bills Are the Biggest Cause of U.S. Bankruptcies: Study,
CNBC (June 25, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://www.cnbe.com/id/100840148 [https://perma.ce/866P-
3AUNI.
338. Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, supra note 328, at 410-11.
339. Jacoby & Holman, supra note 335, at 261 (noting that medical bankruptcy rates were
part of President Obama's rationale for healthcare reform).
340. See Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, supra note 328, at 401 (speculating that lower class
individuals without health insurance may not seek out medical care at all).
341. When contacted by the Washington Post to comment on Obama's plan, Professor
Melissa Jacoby noted that bankruptcy law generally did not expressly prohibit the discharge of
medical debt, but may have that practical effect insofar as the 2005 Amendment "made it
tougher for some consumers to eliminate debts under bankruptcy." Sarah Rubenstein, Obama





this context there are neither prominent Americans nor the "fragile
middle class" to serve as the sympathetic and familiar faces of the
growing catastrophe of unmanageable penal debt, the problem of
penal debt has reached crisis proportions among the nameless
indigent.342 And its consequences are increasingly borne by all classes.
Ultimately, bankruptcy law should serve all debtors without reference
to class status.
C. On Bankruptcy and Socially Relevant Debt Problems
Moreover, bankruptcy has already played an important role in
mitigating the fiscal fallout engendered by big social concerns.
Professors Clayton Gillette and David Skeel have argued that
bankruptcy is an appropriate means of correcting faulty municipal
governance structures that "can exacerbate a city's financial
difficulties and stymie efforts to reverse a downward spiral."343
Gillette and Skeel argue that "fragmented local decision-making" is
often the root of chronic municipal fiscal distress.344 They contend that
entrenched internal political commitments to existing governance
structures that result in waste of municipal financial resources make
municipal officials generally incapable of implementing the
governance reforms necessary to help cities find lasting solutions to
financial distress.345 They argue that a bankruptcy court could
properly serve as a "third party that has the authority to restructure
governing institutions" in order to stem financial excess.346
For example, Gillette and Skeel argue that the de-
centralization of appointive powers of city officials, such as in the
appointment process for a police chief, is often a source of fiscal
instability.3 4 7 They note "the link between effective policing and
municipal financial health" and speculate that "the selection of the
person charged with choosing among plausible policing strategies ...
342. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 5, at 151-52; Hon. Marcia S. Krieger, 'The Bankruptcy
Court Is a Court of Equity"- What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 276 (1999) ("Bankruptcy
laws, by their nature, embody a compromise between fundamental, competing social and
economic objectives. The nature of the compromise varies from time to time as public values and
economic conditions dictate. Bankruptcy law is implemented by using both legal and equitable
procedures."); Alana Semuels, The Fines and Fees That Keep Former Prisoners Poor, ATLANTIC
(July 5, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.comlbusiness/archive/2016/07/the-cost-of-monetary-
sanctions-for-prisoners/489026/ [https://perma.cclK38Q-GJPU].
343. See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 219, at 1184.
344. Id. at 1184-85.
345. Id. at 1189-90.
346. Id. at 1190.
347. Id. at 1187-88.
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could significantly affect a municipality's fiscal stability."348 For this
reason, an appointment process that is centralized in the executive
would have tangible fiscal benefits. Thus, a financially distressed city
whose city charter splits this appointment authority between more
than one governing institution would continually push the city toward
financial instability. Under Gillette and Skeel's proposal, a
bankruptcy judge with the authority to engage in governance reform
"could induce revision of the city charter in a manner that
defragmented municipal decision making by, for example, placing
appointive power over the police department exclusively within the
mayor's jurisdiction."34 9
For Gillette and Skeel, bankruptcy (conditioned on state and
local consent to the reforms)3 50 is a suitable solution for correcting
structures in local governance that "tolerate[] financial decisions in
which the benefits and costs of public expenditures are misaligned,"3 5 1
even though preservation of state and local autonomy is one of the
pillars of municipal reorganization under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code.35 2 They acknowledge that their proposal might raise concerns
that "the rights bankruptcy interferes with are so important that even
meaningful state and local consent to reforms are not sufficient."
3 5 3
Yet Gillette and Skeel suggest that bankruptcy incursions into such
an "inalienable" set of rights, like "[t]he right of a state to determine
the governance structure of its cities," is proper because it addresses
the "deep financial distress" engendered by the failure of "a city's
democratic processes."354 In other words, in their estimation,
bankruptcy becomes relevant once fiscal distress is a consequence of a
broader set of governance-related issues, even though bankruptcy has
not traditionally been geared toward incentivizing change in
municipal governance.
Similarly, in the business bankruptcy context, bankruptcy
judges handle cases that involve national entities whose debt
problems implicate social issues of national importance. For example,
bankruptcy has become an accepted mechanism for addressing the
financial crises stemming from mass torts that have led to national
348. Id. at 1188.
349. Id. at 1190.
350. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the state must authorize a Chapter 9 filing as an initial
matter. "[O]nly a municipality itself can invoke Chapter 9; creditors are prohibited from
throwing a city into Chapter 9 involuntarily." Id. at 1211.
351. See id. at 1152.
352. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012); Jacoby, supra note 215, at 63.




health crises. In the case of asbestos litigation, bankruptcy became a
means of resolving the financial fallout from the massive health crisis
caused by asbestos production and use.3 5 5 In that context, bankruptcy
provided an important and organized forum for asbestos companies to
handle the large quantity of claims "without destroying the enterprise
from which the compensation must come."35 6 It also binds existing and
potential claimants to the terms of the asbestos bankruptcy trusts
that have been formed in the course of the dozens of asbestos
bankruptcy cases that have been filed.35 7 Specifically, the amount that
a claimant is to receive from an asbestos bankruptcy trust generally
depends on a number of factors, including the nature of the illness and
the funding of the trust.358 With respect to those trusts that cannot
guarantee one-hundred percent payment of a qualified claim, the
claimant receives a percentage of the qualified claim.359 The
percentage is further limited by projections of future claims, so that an
individual that is currently ill must accept less than her qualified
claim if the trust anticipates that there may be more claims in the
pipeline.360 Thus, in addition to affecting whether a large company
will stay in business-and all of the social concerns that flow from
that determination-the bankruptcy court, in significant part,
presides over the massive healthcare externalities engendered by the
asbestos crisis. Indeed, according to Bankruptcy Judge Lifland who
presided over the Johns-Manville bankruptcy, "The 'Congressional
purpose' in enacting the [asbestos provisions of the] Code was to
encourage resort to the bankruptcy process."361 And, by and large, we
355. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2012).
356. David A. Skeel, Jr., Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (2003)
(discussing also mass torts related to the Dalkon Shield and breast implants, both significant
women's health problems).
357. S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the Asbestos
Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 841, 851-52:
In spite of the considerable financial contributions to the early trusts, it soon became
apparent that new asbestos plaintiffs would receive, at best, pennies on the dollar for
their claims. The dramatic expansion of asbestos tort litigation drove defendants into
bankruptcy. These bankruptcies left the remaining defendants with considerably
greater liability and sent lawyers searching for new defendants. This cycle continues
to this day.
(footnotes omitted); Marc C. Scarcella & Peter R. Kelso, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts: A 2013
Overview of Trust Assets, Compensation & Governance, LEXISNEXIS (Dec. 11, 2013, 5:01 PM),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/litigation/b/litigation-blog/archive/2013/12/11/asbestos
-bankruptcy-trusts-a-2013-overview-of-trust-assets-compensation-amp-governance.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ML83-P756] (describing the asbestos trust process).
358. Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 357.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Brown, supra note 357, at 848.
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have accepted the bankruptcy court's role in this national health
crisis, even if the outcomes are imperfect.362
Similarly, in the wake of the Catholic Church sexual abuse
crisis, Professor David Skeel speculated on whether bankruptcy would
be an appropriate mechanism for the Church to address the many
cases-and the consequent money judgments-brought against it by
the victims of sexual abuse.363 Skeel observed that, "bankruptcy has
become an important forum for many social issues that cannot be
easily resolved elsewhere," and suggested that as in the mass tort
context, bankruptcy might be a useful means of mediating between
the conflicting interests of the Church and the victims of sexual
abuse.364
D. On Giving Discretion to the Bankruptcy Court
Finally, as both an institutional and substantive matter, we
might worry about vesting these decisions that have important social
implications in the bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy courts do not enjoy
Article III status, and the Supreme Court has on several occasions
limited the powers and autonomy of the bankruptcy courts.365
Professor Troy McKenzie has made a compelling case for the "broad
powers [of bankruptcy judges] to adjudicate important disputes" even
though they are not Article III judges. Specifically, he says that their
appointment by Article III appellate judges coupled with the "almost
nonexistent" market for promotion permits bankruptcy judges to enjoy
a significant amount of autonomy from external political pressures.3 66
Moreover, their position within the larger bankruptcy bar and-
community ensures that bankruptcy judges perform their duties with
"professionalism, creativity, and nonideological adjudication."367 From
this perspective, bankruptcy judges are checked by their "audience,"368
the bankruptcy bar, which by and large promotes reasonable
adjudication in part because "it has a professional interest in
362. Id. at 852 (noting that new asbestos claimants often receive "pennies on the dollar").
363. See Skeel, supra note 356, at 1181.
364. Id.
365. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 469 (2011); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59-61 (1982); see also Casey & Huq, supra note 81, at 1160;
McKenzie, supra note 187, at 775-76.
366. McKenzie, supra note 187, at 795-96.
367. Id. at 747, 775--76. But see Casey & Huq, supra note 81, at 1200-01 (noting in the
business bankruptcy context that "[h]owever skilled [bankruptcy judges] might be in discerning
the going-concern value of an entity, there is no ex ante structural reason to expect bankruptcy
judges to show sensitivity to federalism concerns" (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
368. See McKenzie, supra note 187, at 797-98.
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maintaining the integrity of bankruptcy as a process, the status of the
actors in that process, and the preservation of a certain ideal of
bankruptcy law." 3 6 9 With these checks in place, the bankruptcy court
is institutionally capable of presiding over the discharge of penal debt.
There are several reasons why we might similarly feel
comfortable entrusting this sort of discretion to the bankruptcy court.
First, bankruptcy judges know how to deal with unmanageable debt
incurred in a variety of circumstances, including circumstances that
implicate important national concerns. Accepting Justice Marshall's
perspective that, at the end of the day, penal debt is merely an
outstanding liability on a right to payment, owed like any other "debt"
under the Code,370 relying on a bankruptcy judge to assess whether
the debt should be discharged falls squarely within the expertise of
the bankruptcy court. Moreover, bankruptcy judges routinely and
successfully deal with debt that relates to issues of social significance.
For example, the recent spate of municipal bankruptcies in the cities
of Detroit, Michigan, and San Bernardino, Stockton, and Vallejo,
California, all have raised issues related to matters of public concern
that have city-wide, state-wide, and national repercussions. To the
extent that complex municipal problems have resulted in
unmanageable debt, the bankruptcy court has been largely accepted
as an appropriate locus to resolve the debt overhang caused by the
underlying problems.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy law regards certain debts as categorically
nondischargeable in the name of a set of frames that, on closer view,
do not truly help us to understand why these debts should be treated
exceptionally while others that seem to implicate the same set of
frames are readily dischargeable. Without a meaningful sorting
mechanism, there is no satisfying means of justifying why the fresh
start is subordinated for some debtors while others can discharge their
similarly situated debts.
This line-drawing has significant consequences for the most
vulnerable debtors, as is reflected in the penal debt context. It further
entrenches existing economic disenfranchisement when certain
varieties of debt that are more likely to be concentrated in
economically disenfranchised communities are regarded as
categorically nondischargeable, while debts that are concentrated
369. Id. at 805.
370. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2012).
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further along the socioeconomic spectrum are dischargeable. This
outcome is especially significant if one understands unmanageable
debt as a subordinating force that, among other ills, hinders social
mobility. From this perspective, then, one might recognize bankruptcy
as more than a quasi-vestigial institution and reconsider bankruptcy's
social significance to unmanageable debt that is borne of complex
social problems and implicates issues of economic inequality.371
More generally, the categorical nondischargeability of debt in
bankruptcy frustrates the animating principle of consumer
bankruptcy-the "fresh start." While it is nominally focused on
permitting the debtor to reset her financial life, the fresh start, as it is
currently understood in bankruptcy discourse, has important
implications for society more generally. It is premised, at least in part,
on the idea that it is more beneficial for all if the individual whose
productivity is limited by overwhelming debt can return to a
productive life in society and in the marketplace. This raises issues of
the appeal of the fresh start as an orienting principle, at least in the
consumer context. This Article does not fully engage with this broader
set of normative questions, but functions as one step in that direction.
371. One rejoinder might be that bankruptcy is not intended to serve this purpose; namely,
that bankruptcy law is not intended to solve complicated social issues that are better addressed
in other, perhaps more direct ways. Here, however, unmanageable debt is both an indication of a
broader set of complicated social issues and itself a significant social issue, particularly for
economically disenfranchised communities. And, where debt issues exist, bankruptcy is a valid
part of the conversation.
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